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This dissertation explores three different relevant questions in political economy. 
Chapter 1 is devoted to understanding why populist-outsider candidates get elected, 
and what conditions may favor/hinder their electability. The results show that 
countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect 
populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally 
distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff also are less likely to bring 
these populist outsiders into office. 
 
Chapter 2 in turn explores the role of the middle class in moderating political 
outcome in a framework where money and votes play two distinctive roles in the 
election process. In this chapter, a three-class model of heterogeneous agents is 
developed in which groups affect policy outcomes through their voting behavior and 
contributions to political campaigns, and where income inequality can lead to extreme 
policy outcomes. Increasing the size of the middle class reduces the likelihood of 
  
extreme policy outcomes, as does a richer middle class. This result highlights the 
importance of a large and strong middle class for political stability. 
 
Finally Chapter 3 looks at the question of why inequality has remained persistently 
high in Chile despite its success in reducing poverty and achieving high growth for 
two decades while having a mostly pro-poor structure of public expenditures. We 
show that the key factors explaining this persistent inequality have been a low level of 
fiscal expenditures caused by low tax revenues that have not permitted enough public 
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There is a long history of populist governments in Latin America and elsewhere in the 
world. A few recent examples of so called populist governments include the 
following countries and periods: Peru 1985-1990, Ecuador 2000-2001 and 2006-
present, Venezuela 1999-present, Argentina 2003-present, Italy 2000-2006, and 
Thailand 2001-2006, amongst others. These governments share amongst other things 
the fact that they came to power through the democratic system in fair elections. 
However many of them have to leave office before the end of their constitutional 
term, since usually by the end of the term(s) the situation in the country is  worse off 
than when it began (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989). 
 
Another common feature in many circumstances, especially in recent Latin America, 
is that the elected government is not only considered populist but it is also led by an 
outsider candidate. An outsider is defined as a candidate that runs for office who is 
not part of the traditional party system in the country. Recent examples of outsiders in 
Latin America would be Alberto Fujimori and Ollanta Humala in Peru, Lucio 
Gutierrez and Alvaro Correa in Ecuador, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Fernando 
Lugo in Paraguay. The governments of Lula da Silva in Brazil, Morales in Bolivia 




these cases the party or parties that support these candidates have long been part of 
the political establishment even though they might have had very little power. 
Moreover, in each of the former examples, the coalitions were built around the 
candidate himself, while in the latter it seems that the coalitions were built up prior to 
choosing a candidate. 
 
Populists and outsiders are also more likely to arise where democracy is weak or is 
perceived not to work well. Democracy in Latin America is perceived overall as 
weak, with high levels of corruption, little or no accountability, and unequal 
distribution of rights (Tedesco, 2004; Taylor, 2004). There is also evidence that 
politics in Latin America are driven by Client-ship relations. In this sense there are 
groups (special interest, elites or others) that are organized to obtain favors in 
exchange for their political support. These kinds of relations have been observed both 
in democratic and non-democratic regimes (Taylor, 2004).  
 
Populist governments or movements are far from exclusive to Latin America. Both 
Mussolini and Hitler were considered populists in their time, as was Huey Long in the 
US at about the same time. Moreover, during the 1960’s and 1970’s leftwing populist 
movements were quite powerful throughout Europe. Currently in Europe the populist 
movements are closer to the right-wing agenda though. A few recent examples would 
be Berlusconi in Italy, Le Pen's National Front in France, the late Pim Fortyun's in the 





The rise of outsiders also occurs in the developed world, where outsiders have been 
elected and more recently have affected the outcomes of elections. Recent cases in the 
US that are worth mentioning are independent candidates Rose Perot and Ralph 
Nader in the 1992 and 2000 presidential elections respectively (Abramson, et. al., 
1995). Le Pen in France also might have affected the outcome of the 2002 
presidential election. 
 
It is not so easy to explain why populists and outsiders are elected once we assume 
voters are rational. In order to get voters to elect these candidates even knowing the 
risk implied by their election, voters must have some sort of preference for these 
candidates. I will pose that outsiders are elected or brought into the system due to a 
failure to deliver welfare improvements by the insiders (i.e. the traditional parties). 
This may be explained by insiders being captured by the elites or certain special 
interest groups. Moreover, this failure enables the outsider to rise and since he does 
not face credibility issues (at least not from being in power previously), he can make 
more promises (that he may not be able to fulfill) than the traditional parties can. 
 
In this chapter I will explore the following questions. Why are populist outsider 
candidates elected, over and over again, even when their governments are less than 
successful? How and why do outsiders become part of the political game? How can 
they exist in equilibrium? The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 
I will review the literature on populism and propose a working definition of populism. 




populist outsider. Section 4 presents the main results of the model. Section 5 presents 
some extensions of the basic model and finally Section 5 concludes. 
2. What is Populism? 
 
Perhaps one of the hardest tasks in political science and economics is to find a good 
definition of populism. Populism is often confused for demagogy. Mudde (2004) 
distinguishes two dominant interpretations of the term populism. The first refers to an 
“…emotional and simplistic discourse, that is directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the 
people.” (Mudde, 2004). The second interpretation refers to opportunistic 
politicians/policies that aim to please the people/voters rapidly.  
 
In a way this definition could include a politician only concerned with short-run 
political advantage (eg. lowering taxes just before elections). However both these 
definitions are far from comprehensive and they do not capture the full sense of what 
is typically known as a populist government/movement. Therefore Mudde defines 
populism “…as an ideology that considers society to be… separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’…” 
(Mudde, 2004). This definition is consistent with definitions that call populism as the 
expression of the “general will” of the people (in a way such as the tyranny of the 
majority) in contrast with the idea of democracy as a bargaining process (Crick 2005).  
 
The term ‘populism’ originates from the Populist Party in the United States, circa 




hardship during the period of 1886-1897 in the agriculture states of the south and 
western United States. The movement was composed at first by small farmers on the 
north-south axis that goes from eastern Montana and the western Dakotas to New 
Mexico and Texas. 
 
The party gained momentum given the feeling of disconnection between rural farmers 
and political parties in Washington. This attracted new voters and hence the party ran 
on issues that ranged from prohibition and direct election of senators, to women’s 
suffrage and the supervision of large corporations. Populists had two common 
denominators (i) they wanted to “restore the power to the people” and (ii) they were 




In the political science literature populism has usually been used to describe the 
regimes that governed Latin America in the middle of the twentieth century. Conniff 
(1982, 1999) describes the Latin American version of populism as a grand coalition 
of workers and industrial bourgeois led by a charismatic leader. The populist runs 
under a platform of reform, usually running against the local elites that own the land, 
with promises of either: (i) new jobs and higher wages via industrialization of the 
country; or (ii) political reform and political access to disenfranchised groups (e.g. 
free and fair elections, granting women the right to vote, universal suffrage, etc). This 
                                                 
1 The other case of populism in the US is Huey Long, the Governor and Senator from Louisiana who 
would have ran for president in 1936 but was killed before he had the chance. His main political 
agenda was the restitution of a nation of equals, and he proposed for example a guaranteed universal 





model fits well prior to the 1960’s, describing rulers such as Yrigoyen and Peron in 
Argentina, Alessandri, Ibañez and the Popular Front in Chile, Lazaro Cardenas in 




It is worth noting that another common denominator was that these coalitions were an 
alternative response towards the threat of socialism (or more precisely communism) 
in many countries. The main goal of the movement was to transition towards a 
modern society in which landlord elites would eventually give up power (to the 
industrial bourgeois) while the urban industrial workers would have better paid jobs, 
higher incomes and consequently a better life. It is important to state that inequality 
more than poverty played a fundamental role in setting the conditions that allowed the 
coalition to be built, since the main goal was to redistribute power and/or income. 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) and Sachs (1989) also stress that poverty and income 
inequality played a significant role in the run up to elections in which populists came 
in power. 
  
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989, 1991a) henceforth D&E, describe economic 
populism (or more precisely macroeconomic populism) as a government that 
prioritizes income redistribution policies over efficiency and growth policies3
                                                 
2 The list of potential populists is very large indeed; they include candidates from most Latin American 
countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. 
. 
However in their own description of the “populist” governments in Chile under 
3 Stokes (1999, 2001), uses basically the same distinction, but she names them, security oriented 




Allende and Peru under Garcia, they explain that these governments were elected in 
part to respond to dissatisfaction with growth performance, high levels of poverty, 
and unequal distribution of income. They also recognize that the “economic teams” 
that took office in these governments wanted to achieve growth with redistribution. 
According to D&E the main reason that the populist program failed was “bad 
economics”, since policymakers did not recognize that their program was infeasible. 
The issue is that their assumptions about idle capacity, decreasing long-run costs and 
inflation were wrong. 
 
Rioja and Glomm (2003), Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2004), Mejia and Posada (2007) and 
Campante and Ferreira (2007) have all used a similar concept of populism. In all of 
these papers the main goal of populists is more redistribution towards a certain group 
(usually the poor), and/or no concern for budget deficits.  
 
It is interesting to note that even if D&E are right about the failed nature of the 
economic programs of both governments, when the government was campaigning for 
office it actually believed that the program was achievable. It might be the case that 
the party running for office had “bad” economists, but they cannot be portrayed 
simply as mere opportunists; they really thought that they could achieve both high 
growth and a more equal society. In this sense it might be the case that they were 
naïve, or more precisely, that their policies may have had a chance to succeed but 
didn’t4
                                                 
4 An interesting comparison that comes to mind is that of export-led growth (ELG) versus 






Kaufman and Stallings (1991) describe populism as economic policies designed to 
achieve both political and economic goals. According to their definition these 
governments rely on price controls, income redistribution and run fiscal deficits to 
achieve their goals. For Chile they identify two periods: Ibanez 52-58 and Allende 
70-73. However, Drake (1991) argues that Allende does not fit the pattern in the 
sense that his policies went much further, too encompass not only income 
redistribution, but also redistribution of property and more generally wealth. Drake 
(1991) argues that even though the programs of socialists and populists overlapped in 
many cases, in the case of Allende it was the former that predominated rather than the 
latter. 
 
Another important feature of populism is charisma (Conniff 1982, 1999). Within the 
political science framework we could call this “quality of the politician”. Not all 
populists were elected (most notoriously Haya de la Torre in Peru), and many elected 
ones ended their government prematurely, usually in some sort of political crises. But 
one common denominator was that most if not all populists were able to bring the 
masses towards them and lead them to the polls. 
 
In the more recent literature Weyland (1999, 2002) describes what he defines as 
neopopulism, which is a combination of neoliberal policies and a populist or 
                                                                                                                                           
observe that countries that undertook ISI policies grew faster than countries that undertook ELG during 
the 1960’s and 1970’s while this was reverted since the 1980’s (Carbaugh, 2005). Consequently when 
asked in the late seventies about the best strategy for growth it might have been the case that ELG 




charismatic leader. The main exponents of this strand were Fernando Collor de Melo 
in Brazil, Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Perez in 
Venezuela. All of these have in common that they ran as populists and later enacted 
neoliberal reforms5
 
. It is worth noting though that Collor de Melo ran on a neoliberal 
platform while the rest actually ran closer to a left-wing platform and once elected 
enacted neoliberal reforms. According to the liberal populism literature (Roberts, 
1995), this was possible given that social institutions were weak and allowed for a 
clientelistic approach by the charismatic leader, and this would be “populism”. Choi 
(2005) explores a similar argument for the recently overthrown government in 
Thailand and concludes that the populist government in Thailand has its origins in 
inequality rather than an institutional issue. 
This economic version of populism can also be defined as ex-post populism, since it 
basically tries to explain the effects of the policies put in place after the populist has 
come to power. On the other side, the political science perspective has in a sense tried 
to understand ex-ante populism, concerning how populists get elected. This paper will 
attempt to explicitly model ex-ante populism in an economic framework, and also to 
some extent, given the definition of populism (in terms of political strategy) I use, 
bring together both concepts in one framework6
 
. 
                                                 
5 According to Stokes (1999, 2002) these are actually policy switchers. At least in the case of Menem, 
according to Stokes, they only ran a left wing platform to be able to win, but they always had planned 
to undertake neoliberal reforms. This would in turn be a case of opportunistic politicians that “lies” in 
order to get elected. There is a narrow line between this and a demagogue. 




All of the above said, it is time to present my definition of a populist. I will define a 
populist as a politician that has the following four characteristics: 
 
i.) As a politician he/she behaves opportunistically, motivated by being in 
power, but uses elections to achieve his goals. 
ii.) He targets certain groups to rally around him. 
iii.) He promises redistribution (of income, wealth or power) to the groups in 
the coalition. 
iv.) He is a charismatic leader, and uses his charisma to get votes. 
 
Out of the four characteristics, the latter is the one that makes a populist really 
different from a traditional politician. The idea is that populists use their charisma to 
attract voters, instead of using other formal political mechanisms. This is, he will not 
care about appealing to special interest group that may contribute money to his 
campaign, since he would not use it7
3. The Model 
.  
 
This model has two types of voters. First there is a fraction (1-α) of impressionable 
voters modeled in the spirit of Baron (1994), as a continuum of voters of mass 1-α 
that are distributed uniformly in preferences for policy platforms ‘τ’, along the [0,1] 
                                                 
7 Berdugo (2006) uses a similar characteristic in a signal-extraction model where charisma and quality 
of the politician are correlated but not individually observable and shows that charisma may increase 
the capacity of politician to get elected and commit to certain platforms. Kartik and McAfee (2007) use 
“character” instead of charisma, where character is desired by voters, and show that non-character 
candidates choose policies such that the probability of being elected is at least as big as a candidate 




interval. For tractability I assume that a platform is one-dimensional. These voters 
receive (dis)utility from three things: policies implemented by the winning candidate, 
quality or appeal of the candidate and the cost of going to the polls. Voters thus have 


















, where ci is the cost of voting for voter i, 
which for now I assume constant and equal to c9; τi and τk are the most preferred 
platform for voter i and the announced platform by candidate k respectively; F(⋅) is an 
increasing and concave function; M are the campaign contributions received by k that 
will depend on the announced platform τk, while θk is a random variable representing 
the charm, charisma or appeal of the candidate. F represents a mapping from charm 
or advertising into perceived quality. I assume that quality in itself is not observable, 
but charisma and money expenditures are; and charisma and money are positively 
correlated with quality of the candidate10
                                                 
8 The particular form of the utility function is used to obtain close formed solutions. In particular all is 
required from the utility function for the results to prevail is that it is increasing in charisma and money 
and decreasing in cost of voting and distance to the implemented platform. This generates that the 
voting outcome of impressionable voters in terms of the share of votes is a closed interval in the [0,1] 
line. An alternative specification that would not alter the main results would be to assume the 
following utility function: 
. If the voter does not vote his utility is Ui(no 

























, where money 
now affects the cost of voting (with c now the cost function of voting) and not the platforms 
themselves. 
9 The cost of voting may include the registering to vote, work days lost and/or other costs. Therefore it 
may vary across individuals or groups. In particular it could account for disenfranchised groups (e.g. 
poor voters, racial minorities, etc.). 
10 In this context I am also including candidates with high charisma/charm and significant expenditure. 
Higher charm would attract voters to the polls, and campaign expenditures are assumed to better 
convey the message. This is, candidates with low expenditure cannot convey their positions so clearly 
as candidates with higher expenditures. We are modeling campaign expenditures as informative about 




preferences presented here are similar to those proposed by Schachar and Nalebuff 
(1999) in the sense that candidates can use money to influence voter turnout. They are 
also standard in the public choice literature where voters derive utility from winning.  
 
Candidates need either charm or money (or both) to get voters to vote. Charisma is 
exogenous while money depends on campaign contributions by non-impressionable 
voters, which in the rest of the paper will be named contributors11
 
. I assume that there 
is a fraction α of these voters that contribute funds to the campaign of either 
candidate, depending on the proposed platform and their preferences. All contributor 
voters contribute a fixed amount of money M to one candidate. This assumption is 
used to avoid the collective action problem that arises from marginal contributions. 
This result could arise endogenously assuming a group utility rule such as the one 
presented by Coate and Conlin (2004), in which all members of each coalition 
contribute the same amount.  
Contributors’ policy preferences are also distributed uniformly in a subset of the 
continuum [0,1], particularly in the interval [τc-β, τc+β], where τc is the most 
preferred platform of the median contributor. 
 
Assumption 1:  τc > ½. This is the median contributor will be always located to the 
right of the median voter. 
 
                                                 




This assumption will induce the outsider later on to choose a platform on the left side 
of the political map, since as we will see traditional parties will need be choose a 
platform closer to the median contributor, which as just mentioned is right-of-
center12
 
. Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of preferences by voters. 
 
Figure 1: Voters Characteristics 
 
Contributors participate in two stages. In the first stage they decide to contribute M to 
the party that proposes a platform closest to their own. In the second stage they vote 
for whoever they contributed. Contributor j thus decides to contribute Mj according to 





























      ),(
      ),0(




                                                 
12 All results are maintained if I assume that the contributors are skewed to the left of the median voter. 
The only difference will be that the outsider would choose the “other” extreme to propose his platform. 
0 1 
(1-α) impressionable voters 
0 1 







In the second stage contributors now vote in the same way as they contributed and all 





















  and party L will obtain 
RL MMM −= α , if this is an interior solution. Otherwise we may obtain ML=αM and 




There are two parties R,L that only care about being in power. Each party draws a 
candidate with a given amount of charisma θR or θL simultaneously and 
independently. Charisma is private information for each party. Parties then announce 
a platform τ (henceforth τR or τL) under which they run. There is a third outsider 
candidate drawn by nature, endowed with charm θOUT. θk is drawn in each case from 
a distribution with  CDF Ω(θk), kk ∀∞∈ ),,0[θ . As mentioned earlier, given that 
τc>τm this will induce the outsider to choose a platform to the left of R and L, thus 
generating a left wing outsider. The case for a right wing outsider will be analogous, 
but with the roles of party R and L reversed, and it requires assuming τc<τm. 
 
Assumption 2 (no crossing over): I assume that the following condition is always 
true: τR ≥ τL . This is party R always chooses a platform equal to or to the right of 





This assumption is used to rule out left wing platforms by right wing parties and is 
useful to simplify the analysis. We can have convergence but no crossing over. 
 
The parties' problem is therefore to choose their platform τk to maximize their 
probability of being elected, which can be defined for L as: 
 
))()(())()(()elected is Pr( RVLVprobOUTVLVprobL >∧>=   
 
where V(k) is the fraction of votes that candidate k receives. This is the sum of votes 
by impressionable VI and non impressionable voters VC.  From impressionable voters, 
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where τ and τ  represent voters that are indifferent between two candidates or 














. Non-impressionable voters vote according to their 
contributions and therefore split between R and L in the same fractions as they split 
contributions. Thus, , and )(1)( RVLV CC −= 14
)()1()()( kVkVkV IC αα −+=
. 
Finally total votes for candidate k are given by: . 
Figure 2 presents two examples of the votes received by each candidate for a given 
                                                 
13 I have defined a more general case for the distribution but I will still assume a uniform distribution. 
14 This is the result of the interior solution. For corner solutions VC(R)=0 or 1, and consequently 




platform choice for each of them. The left panel shows the case in which everyone 
votes, while the right panel shows a case in which some voters abstain. Votes for the 
outsider, L and R are given by the red, light and dark blue intervals respectively. The 









The timing of events is as follows: 
 
1. Charisma for each party candidate is drawn by nature. 
2. Parties announce their platforms (τR and τL) to maximize their votes given 
their beliefs about the charisma of each candidate. 





4. An outsider is drawn by nature with θOUT, and chooses his platform τOUT 
without observing contributions for other candidates in order to maximize his 
votes.  
5. Elections are held, voters vote and the candidate or party with the most votes 
wins and takes office. 
 
Definition 1: A political equilibrium in this model consists of a pair of strategies 
(τR(θR),τL(θL)) such that each party maximizes its expected votes considering the 
expected θOUT and the other party’s platform. The concept of equilibrium is Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). 
 
We can easily observe that the platform choice of each party will depend on the 
charisma of the candidate. The more charisma the candidate has, the less money he 
will need to "buy votes". The result arises from the fact that charisma and money are 
perfect substitutes in attracting votes. For candidate R, his share of votes is 





























































  (1) 
Candidate R will thus choose τR as to maximize the expected value of the RHS of (1). 
Note that (1) does not depend on the platform of the outsider. As observed in Figure 
2a, the outsider in this model only fights over votes with Candidate L as we have 
                                                 
15 I am assuming that party R does not reach further than voter with τi=1. If he does, then he would try 




assumed the outsider locating to the left of L. Thus R’s only has to fight over votes 
with L not the outsider. For simplicity, we analyze first the optimal behavior of R and 
after that the optimal behavior of L, which as will be seen is only a minor extension of 
R’s. 
 
From assumption 1 we know that R always set its platform equal to L or to the right 
of L. Given τL choosing to the right of τL has two effects. First R obtains fewer 












R . Moreover 











N RV . 
However, candidate R will gain votes from his right side by moving away from the L 
platform. Depending on the level of resources (charisma plus money) R will retain a 
smaller or larger share of the votes “to his left” assuming L’s platform is fixed16
 
. The 
net effect will depend on the amount of charisma θR, and other parameters. In 


























�      (2) 
 
The first term corresponds to the non-impressionable voters that R loses. The first 
term in brackets correspond to the impressionable voters R loses due to lower money. 
                                                 





The other two terms in bracket correspond to the impressionable voters R wins/loses 
when she separates from L, leaving a gap between them. From the above expression 
and taking as given α, β, c, M, θL, τL, we can findθ~  such that θθ ~>∀ R , )( RR θτ will 
be increasing in θR. This will be valid over some range of platforms, depending on the 
precise shape of F, and it requires assumption 2.  By the same token, θθ ~≤∀ R , 
CRR τθτ =)( 17,18
 
.  
Assumption 2: I will assume that if τR = τL = τ, then candidate L will get the non-
contributor votes from the left of τ, and R will get the votes to the right19
 
. 
Assumption 2 is only needed to ensure the next result and the one just mentioned, but 
it is not needed for the rest of the paper. 
 
Proposition 1 (charisma leads to extremism): The more charisma a party candidate 
has, the more he or she will move to the extreme. This is, more charismatic leaders in 
both parties will choose platforms farther to the left or right of the median 
contributor.  
 
                                                 
17 In fact the optimal strategy would be LRR τθτ =)( , but this could violate assumption 1 since it 
could be the case that in expectation party R chooses a value to the left of τC, and later party L choose 
τC. 
18 In fact it may be possible that at some level of θθ =R  voter “1” is indifferent between voting for 
R or not voting, therefore θθ >∀ R  we have that the optimal strategy will be to move back to the 
center. 
19 This assumption enables both candidates to choose the median contributor. Otherwise if both 
converge, by the fact that they are exactly the same to all non contributor voters, this would mean that 
all of them would vote for whoever has the highest charisma, while the other candidate would only 










τ only if the third 
term in brackets is large enough to cancel the other terms in the expression which 
are all negative. This will only occur if θθ ~>R . Thus having a higher θR or θL 
leads to choosing a platform to the left and right of τC respectively. ■ 
 
Corollary 1: Candidates with no charisma converge to τC . If party candidates do 
not have charisma (or cannot use it), then they will converge to the platform of τC. 
 
Proof: This is a direct consequence of proposition 1. ■  
 
Let’s now consider party L. The most interesting case is when there is a voter 
indifferent between L and the Outsider, i.e. a case where L and the outsider are 
fighting for votes like in Figure 2a. If this set were the empty set, then the analysis is 
exactly the same as for R, but in the other direction. Otherwise candidate L obtains 





















�                 (3) 
 
Expression (3) is similar to (1). However the second term in (3), which accounts for 
the impressionable vote share of L, reflects the fact that L will face competition on 





Following the same analyses done for Party R, I can now look at the effect of L 
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With some algebra we can also find a θ~ , such that θθ ~>∀ L , )( LL θτ will be 
decreasing in θL. This will be valid over some range of platforms and depending on 
the precise shape of F. By the same token, θθ ~≤∀ L , CLL τθτ =)( . Note however 
that the exact effect of moving the platform will not only depend on the value of L’s 
own θL, but also on the value of θOUT. The higher θOUT is, the lower the benefits from 
moving to the left for L. 
 
Given these assumptions we can now solve for the outsider. In the next proposition I 
will find the optimal strategy of the outsider, given his information set. By 
construction I have assumed that outsiders do not have access to contributors. 
Therefore their optimal strategy will be to get as many impressionable voters as 
possible. The share of votes for the (left-wing) outsider is given by the following 
expression: 
𝑉(𝑂𝑈𝑇) = (1 − 𝛼) �min �𝜏𝑂𝑈𝑇 + 𝐹(𝜃
𝑂𝑈𝑇)
𝑐
, 𝜏𝑒� − max �𝜏𝑂𝑈𝑇 − 𝐹(𝜃
𝑂𝑈𝑇)
𝑐





The term minimized in the brackets represents the share of vote to the right of the 
outsider, while the term maximized in brackets subtracts any votes that the outsider 
may not get on her left. If everyone on the left votes for the outsider, then the second 


















































τ , and the objective function of the outsider is to 
maximizes his (expected) votes (expected RHS of 4), given his own charisma and 
given the platforms chosen by R and L. This leads us to proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: The optimal strategy for the outsider is to set a platform τOUT such that 
corner voter 0 is just indifferent between voting and not. Let this platform be τ*. This 
platform is the best response given the strategies set by the insider candidates. 
 
Proof:  I can show that choosingτ* will yield the highest possible share of votes 
for the outsider given the strategies of the other candidates. Assume the outsider 
chooses a platform slightly to the right of τ*, say τ**=τ*+ε. The indifferent voter 
on the left side is given by the following condition: 
( ) ( ) 2121 )()( *** cFcFi OUTOUTτ θθ εττ −+=−= , but the indifferent voter under τ* is 
zero, so we know that ( ) 21)(*0 cF OUTθτ −= , therefore 0>= ετ i . By moving to the 





On the right side the indifferent voter now is given by the following condition: 
( ) ),*min( 21)( ecFj OUT τεττ θ−+= , where τe represent the indifferent voter between 
the outsider and the candidate from party L. If the two candidates do not intersect 
voters then the outsider candidate gains the same fraction of votes on the right as 
the ones he lost on the left. Conversely if they do intersect, then the outsider will 
lose a fraction of votes to the L candidate.  
 
Finally if the outsider chooses a platform slightly to the left of τ*, such as 
τ***=τ*-ε, then his voting share will be reduced, since the indifferent left side 
voter will be less than zero (that is 0<= ετ i ). On the right side, he may gain a 
fraction of voters if his voters were previously intersecting with candidate L's 
voters, but he would earn fewer votes than the ones he lost on the bottom. If τe 
was not active, then he would only lose votes. 
 
Therefore choosing τ* is the best response and given the strategies by insiders, 
dominates all other possible choices.■ 
 
This strategy will imply that in general τ*<τm. The outsider will choose a 





Corollary 2: Centrist populists. Although most populist will choose extreme 
platforms, we show that the more charisma a populist has, the more he can move 
towards the center. 
 















τ . Therefore more charisma will mean the populist 
can build a bigger coalition, and this will be done by a choosing a more centrist 
platform, while still getting votes from the far left.■ 
4. Results and Analysis 
 
The simple framework described above yields some interesting predictions 
concerning the results of elections. In particular the composition of the electorate will 
matter in determining who wins the election. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the fraction (α) of contributor voters reduces the 
probability of election of an outsider in two different ways: 
a) Higher α strictly reduces the share of impressionable voters. 
b) Higher α increases contributions for party candidates. 
 
Proof: For the first part, a higher α strictly reduces the pool of potential voters for 















τ α , where K= ( ) 21)( )( LF OF , and 




∂ e  will be the same as the sign of 
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OFMK                         (5)             
which is negative as long as the halfway point between R and L is a contributor, 
since F(⋅) is an increasing function. The reason for this is that an increase in the 
share of contributors α reduces the share of votes the outsider receives if there are 
initially voters that are indifferent between the outsider and L. In such case an 
increase in α causes these previously indifferent voters to favor L due to the 
higher contributions received by L. ■  
 
Corollary 3: A country with higher concentration of wealth is more likely to elect 
outsiders than a country with more equal distribution of wealth. 
 
Proof: This follows directly from proposition 3 if we assume that a lower α 
implies that wealth is more concentrated. ■ 
 
This result arises from the fact that a higher concentration reduces total contributions, 
and therefore the share of votes by insiders. An alternative would be to keep (αM) 




case there is still a reduction in the probability of electing an outsider with higher α20
 
. 
However the effect now comes only from the first effect, the fact that a higher α 
implies that there are fewer “impressionable” voters that the outsider can lure, 
therefore reducing his/her  “base” and consequently his/her share of votes as well. 
Another interesting corollary is that if we assume that economic crises can shift 
people from one group to another, say by reducing α, then the model would predict 
that an outsiders’ chance to get elected increases during a crisis.  
The model predictions are explained basically by the following issues. First, consider 
the constraints faced by both insiders and the outsider. Insiders are constrained in 
their platform choices, since they need to obtain contributions to finance their 
campaign. In this context both parties fall in a trap, where even if they wanted to 
move further towards the median voter, they would lose contributions and hence they 
would not be able to get out their message. The problem is that insiders must care 
more about contributions than about the citizens’ preferences, and this arises from the 
fact that without money it is harder to run a campaign, unless the insider has a very 
high level of charisma. 
 
On the other hand, the outsider is constrained by his endowment (of charisma, charm, 
etc). He is free to choose any given platform, but cannot control his endowment or 
                                                 
20 Yet another possible assumption is that contributors give a fixed “share” of their income. If we keep 
the average income constant Y, then an increase in α must decrease the relative income of the rich in 
order to maintain the average income. Let M=γyr where γ is the share of income devoted to 
contributions and yr>1 is the income of the rich, and assume yp=1 is the income of the poor. Then Y= α 
yr+(1- α) and M=γ[Y-(1- α)]/α. Now αM=γ[Y+α-1], and γα
α =∂
∂ )( M >0. Thus a rise in α, maintaining 
average income constant, this just increasing inequality, still increases total contributions, and 




raise campaign contributions. He/she chooses the platform that yields him the highest 
possible share of impressionable votes, but this is not always enough to get elected. 
 
Now consider a variation in the game presented above in which there is an additional 
stage in the model, just before elections, where traditional parties in fear of losing to 
the outsider agree to share government in some way21. In this scenario the results 
depend on certain assumptions we make on what can each party do. I assume that 
once a candidate chooses his platform, he cannot deviate from this commitment. This 
assumes the candidates care about credibility. In this sense, it can be argued that a 
candidate would be accused of "flip-flopping", lose his credibility and consequently 
potential voters if he changes his platform. I also assume that voters vote sincerely in 
this part of the game22. 23
 
 
Thus the game changes in the following way. After the outsider is selected, the party 
candidate with lowest charisma drops out and the other party candidate retains his/her 
previous platform which will be denoted by P; and I will assume that the money spent 
on the other candidate is passed on to the other candidate24 RP ττ =. That is:  if 
LR θθ >  and LP ττ =  otherwise and LRP MMM += . Under these conditions we can 
posit the next result. 
 
                                                 
21 In order for this to occur at least one of the parties must perceive a very large disutility from electing 
the outsider.  
22 This is only necessary for the corollary not for the proposition.  
23 We can think of this as assuming there is a runoff between the outsider and one of the other two 
parties. 
24 Recall that parties wish to maximize votes, and combining the money from both candidates implies 




Proposition 4: If one traditional party candidate drops out of the election, the 
probability of electing an outsider is reduced. 
 
Proof: The proof is done in two parts. I first show that P will have higher votes 
than either party candidate before. Then I show that the share of votes to the 
outsider will not increase enough to increase the probability of election. 
 
From the share of votes each party receives, the traditional party P will now get 
the votes from both sides, such that his/her expected share of votes VP will be:
( ) ( ){ }),max()1,min()1( 2121 )()( ecPFPcPFPPV ττταα −−+−+= , which is greater than the 
share of votes R and L initially had, since now candidate P has all contributor 
voters plus votes form the other party candidate.25
 
 The exact share of votes from 
the other party candidate depends on the specific choice of platform and specific 
charisma, but it is always larger than the previous case. 
If the outsider faces the candidate from the L party, then he/she will obtain at 
most the same share of votes, or if the additional money buys enough votes for P, 




























OUT θττθτα . Now 
an increase in money for L will only affect this expression through a change in eτ . 
                                                 
25 Note that )()( PP MFPF += θ , where MP may include donations from both R and L or alternatively 


























OFOLδ , an increase in money for L 




























<0 and OUTL ττ > . 
 
If, on the other hand the outsider faces the candidate from the R party, then he/she 
could theoretically increase the share of votes, since Rτ  is further away from 
OUTτ compared to Lτ . However, any increase in the vote share for the outsider 









F OUTOUT )(θτ   if R cannot reach any voter L reached before. This increase in 
voting will smaller than the increasing in voting for R, since R’s vote share is 
increased to capture votes on both sides of his/her platform. If there is no 
indifferent voter between the outsider and candidate R, then in fact R has doubled 
his/her votes. Otherwise, the increase will be less than double, but significantly 
larger than the increase for the outsider. Thus the probability of electing the 
outsider is reduced. ■ 
 
Corollary 4: A country with a runoff election has a lower probability of choosing an 





Proof: This follows directly from proposition 2 if we assume that a runoff is 
equivalent to having a candidate drop out of the election, with the additional 
requirement of sincere voting in the first round. ■ 
 
Finally I consider the impact of the bias in preferences of  the median contributor 
compared to the median voter. I summarize this result in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 (Elite vs “the people”): If the preferences of the median contributor 
are further away from the median voter, then the outsiders odds of winning increases.   
 
Proof: The proof follows from the expressions for the share of votes that each 
candidate obtains. In particular if both party candidates converge to the median 
contributor, but this contributor is more skewed to the right, then if the outsider 
has a high draw of charisma, he has more space towards the middle before he has 
to compete for votes against L, increasing the odds of winning. ■ 
 
This last proposition to some extent may reflects in part the feeling in Latin America 
that outsiders have a better chance when traditional parties are not delivering what is 
expected from them. In effect if traditional parties become more biased, then the 
populist-outsider is indeed in a better position to win the election. If in addition we 




conjecture that corruption by politicians may diminish charisma for both parties, then 
the outsider have an even better chance of winning the election.26
 
 
5. Comparing Populism in Europe and Latin America27
 
 
One interesting feature of modern populism is that most populist movements in 
Europe have a “right-wing” platform while most populist movements in Latin 
America appear to be running on a “left-wing” platform. Mudde (2004), Adams 
(2003) and Taggart (2004) document the following “right-wing” populist movements 
in Europe during the last 15 years: Le Pen’s National Front in France; Fortyun’s in 
Netherlands; the FPO in Austria; Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in Italy; and other small 
parties in Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Germany. 
 
Although these parties or movements are not the same, they all follow certain 
patterns, such as the appeal to “the people”, the nationalistic themes (in this case 
mostly as euro-skeptics) and general distaste for “the elites”. Moreover their appeal is 
mostly seen as right-wing at least regarding their stand on immigration and 
integration with the rest of Europe. European populists typically argue that existing 
redistribution benefits (illegal) immigrants and government bureaucrats (which may 
be considered the elite) at the expense of the average “national citizen”, and propose a 
reversal of such redistribution. 
                                                 
26 There is at least anecdotal evidence that corruption may have an overall negative effect on 
democracy itself, since voters may attach beliefs of corruption to all parties, and not only to the one(s) 
in power.  





In contrast when looking at the Latin American version of populism in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela we observe a different version of populism, 
more in the spirit of Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), directed at re-nationalizing the 
privatized public enterprises, agrarian reform and generally a taste for extreme left-
wing policies of redistribution. Their desired redistribution therefore goes from the 
wealthy land-owner elites or foreign corporations towards “the poor” which coincides 
with “the people” in their case.  
 
The framework proposed in this paper can explain the emergence of both types of 
populism. In fact if we conjecture that the elites are actually located “left-of-center” 
in Europe while “right-of-center” in Latin America, then the conundrum is resolved, 
since the model predicts populism arising from the opposite side. The main issue is to 
understand and explain why the elites would be located in different places. I have 
proposed above that the elites perhaps are not the same in both cases. In Europe 
populism represents a backlash against immigration and government bureaucrats 
since the former have access to the welfare state and therefore increase the tax bill, 
while the latter would increase the tax bill directly as well. This proceeds from the 
fact that taxes are already very high in Europe and significant redistribution already 
occurs. In Latin America by contrast populism is typically directed against the 
“traditional parties”, which have ties to the economic elite as thus obtain favors for 
them.28
                                                 
28 The exception is that in Argentina the populist movement has always been against the land-owner 
elite. 




elite, and given the high levels of poverty and inequality prevailing in the region, it is 
no surprise that populism looks for more redistribution of wealth, via nationalization 




This section contains a few extensions of the basic model and future ideas for changes 
or additions to the model that could help understand other populist phenomena. 
 
Populist Parties or Populist Strategies 
 
First consider the following variant in which there is only one traditional party 
running for the election. Moreover I will assume that the other “traditional” party 
decides to run a “populist” strategy, such that we will now have parties T (for 
traditional) and P (for populist). 29
 
 In this context the optimal strategy for party T will 
always be to choose the platform preferred by the median contributor, since this will 
maximize her number of votes. Moreover, party P will always choose a platform such 
that voter 0 is indifferent just as the outsider would.  
In this two party system the odds of winning the election depend on the draws of 
charisma, but also on the institutional conditions. For example, changes in the shares 
                                                 
29 The idea is that party P chooses not to accept contributions and thus is “freed” from elite to choose 




of contributors or total contributions will affect the number of votes. A higher share 
of contributors increases the share of votes of T, while more skewed contributors 
increase votes for P. If contributions are reduced, for example due to economic crises, 
then party P has a higher probability of winning. 
 
Campaign Finance Reform 
 
Another extension deals with either capping contributions, or public funding of 
elections. Either institution will cause a reduction in the probability of electing an 
outsider. However the consequences of any particular reform are not straightforward, 
and will depend on the assumptions we build into the model. For example if we 
decide to cap contributions this would have the following effects. Parties would be 
able to “buy” fewer votes using their money, but their optimal level of charisma 
above which they choose to depart from the center will be decreased. In effect, from 
equation (2) we can observe that a lower level of maximum M will affect the optimal 
level of charisma for moving away from the median voter. In this context, with 
campaign contribution caps, parties will converge to median contributor less 
frequently than under no contribution caps.  
 
The other possibility is for publicly financing campaigns. Under this model if we 
assume that all parties get a minimum amount of money from public financing, then 
this would generate the following results. Traditional parties would not change their 




the median contributor. The argument is the same line of reasoning as in the previous 
case but now party candidates in a sense start with a higher level of the initial 
charisma-money endowment. 
 
The more interesting case combines both features: campaign limits with public 
funding. In this scenario, both candidates may diverge from the median contributor 
since their optimal strategy can now be to cater to contributors just enough to obtain 
the maximum permitted. They will still choose their platform such that it will be most 
preferred platform of some contributor, but not the median contributor. The argument 
for candidate R is as follows. She chooses a platform such that she gets exactly the 
contributions needed to complete the cap. If she moves from there to the left, then she 
loses some money and therefore voters. If otherwise she moves to the right, she does 
not get more money since she cannot receive any more, and thus loses voters given 
that L will have a closer platform to hers. Therefore her optimal strategy is to choose 




One limiting feature of the model presented here is that contribution levels are 
exogenously identical for all contributors. An interesting extension is therefore to 
allow the level of contributions to be varying and endogenous. This requires certain 
changes in the model. We now have to model contributors in a more sophisticated 




problem. Given that I have assumed a continuum of contributors, if I allow them to 
choose a level of contributions, they will always choose zero, since the “individual 
effect” of choosing zero does not affect total contributions. To overcome this issue we 
need therefore to make some additional assumptions. I assume that each contributor 
will contribute a given amount depending on the distance from the platform proposed 
by the candidates. Therefore his contributions will be given by the following 
expression: )0,)(max( 2iki MM ττϖ −−= . So he will contribute up to M  to the 
candidate that is closest to him, and the amount contributed will be reduced if the 
candidate chooses a platform away from his most preferred one30
 
. Depending on the 
parameters we can obtain different total profiles and optimality conditions for the 
parties. If ϖ is very high, then there will be contributors that will not give money, 
since the distance effect will dominate. Otherwise if ϖ is low, it may be that all 
contributors give some money, but the ones closest to the candidates give the most. 
The optimal behavior of parties will also depend on these parameters. A low ϖ will 
generate a profile of contributions closer to the case of a fixed amount, while higher 
values may shift optimal platform choice away from the median contributor. An 
interesting case, for example, is if we assume that the median contributor and median 
voter coincide, and that contributors and voters are equally distributed. In this context 
if there is no outsider, the optimal strategy for both candidates will be to choose a 
                                                 
30 This profile of contributions can also be obtained by assuming that contributors belong to a group (of 
similar preferences), and they all follow the optimal rule, otherwise if they deviate they get socially 
punished with a big enough cost that it would make it too costly to deviate. This kind of behavior is 




platform such that the extreme voter on their side just votes for them31
 
. In this case 
more charisma will play the same role as for the populist, meaning it will drive them 
to the center, while less charismatic candidates will move to the extreme. 
The middle class 
 
Given that the Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) definition of populism relies on 
redistribution, we can infer that higher levels of poverty or more income inequality 
may lead towards populism. I have shown in a very simplistic form the role of 
inequality, and given that I only model two groups of people this is also a proxy for 
poverty. This simplification, although useful for capturing some features, is perhaps 
very naïve. To overcome this we might want to model other voters explicitly. One 
alternative is modeling the middle class. In the next chapter of this dissertation I add a 
group of voters that is neither impressionable nor contributors, and similarly 
distributed in the [0,1] line such that we can enrich the analysis from the income 




The history of populist and outsider governments in the world is probably far from 
over. In fact in recent years we have seen an increasing number of populist-outsiders 
                                                 
31 The argument is the same as for the outsiders, choice. Moving towards the center will give them 




who have come into power. This chapter presents a simple theory that attempts to 
explain why populists are successful in running for office.  
 
The chapter presents a model of political competition in which two parties and an 
outsider run for office. The main results of the model show under what circumstances 
an outsider is more likely to succeed. I have shown in a simple framework how 
income distribution and electoral institutions and preferences can play a role in 
facilitating or not the election of populist candidates. The implications of the model 










Chapter 2: The Effects of Income Distribution on Electoral 
Outcomes: the role of the middle class 
     
"Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by 
citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-
administered in which the middle class is large, and strong... (f)or the 
addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the 
extremes from being dominant". Aristotle, Politics (306 BC) 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
There is ample anecdotal evidence that indicates that a larger and stronger middle 
class is associated with more political stability and less extreme policies. Among the 
few attempts to explore this question empirically, Easterly (2001) finds that a stronger 
middle class (measured as the share of national income going to quintiles 2, 3 and 4) 
has a positive effect on democratic stability, by increasing political freedoms (civil 
liberties and political rights) and reducing the number of revolutions and coups and 
changes to the Constitution. 
 
To add some additional evidence for policies within a democracy I present some 
preliminary results from analyzing voting behavior from the US Congress. Taking the 




measure of policy extremism, I regress this variable against certain district 
characteristics, particularly the size of the middle class in the district, which is 
computed from the Summary File 3 of the 2000 US Census32. My results, 
summarized in Table 1, show that the size of the middle class seems to play an 
important role in reducing extreme policy outcomes33
 
. 
Table 1: Regression Results: Dependent Variable: Square of DW Nominate Score 
(Poole & Rosenthal) for 106th Congress 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Middle Class Size -0.283* -0.508*** -0.304* 
 
[0.162] [0.167] [0.178] 
Log of Median Income 0.036 0.048 0.053 
 






% of Black Population 
  
0.149*** 
   
[0.049] 
Constant 0.058 0.158 -0.084 
 
[0.313] [0.307] [0.315] 
Observations 437 437 437 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.07 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
32 The DW nominating score measures on a [-1,1] scale how liberal/conservative is each 
Representative in that Congress, based on his voting record. A value of zero is a moderate, while -1 
indicates extreme liberal and 1 extreme conservative. The middle class is measured as the share of 
population that is not poor and has a household income below $200,000. 
33 Unfortunately I cannot test for the relative strength of the middle class with this procedure since the 




Hence the evidence seems to suggest that the middle class reduces policy extremism. 
But why does the middle class reduce extremism? A simple answer is that the middle 
class is a large and homogenous group that can either vote/contribute as a bloc to get 
their preferred policies, which would lie between those preferred by poor and rich 
groups. The problem with this answer is that it is based on the assumption of 
ideological homogeneity of the middle class. And as I show in Table 2, according to 
the 2004 Annual National Elections Study the average value of the liberal-
conservative self identification is very similar for each income group34 35. Table 2 
also indicates that the standard deviation of preferences, shown in parentheses, is 
similar for each group36
 
. So the middle class does not seem to have preferences that 
necessarily lie between the rich and the poor, which gives us the following puzzle: If 
the middle class is not homogenous why do they moderate policy outcomes? 
  
                                                 
34 The liberal-conservative self identification consists in asking citizens to ideologically self locate 
themselves on a 7 point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. 
35 Gertais (1998) divides the middle class into at least two distinctive groups (and in some cases three) 
in terms of their political alignment, clustering the groups by professions. 
 
36 I also cannot reject the equality of means and of standard deviation for each sample. The results hold 





Table 2: Political Ideology by Income Group 2004 
Group  Mean Political Ideology 
(Std. Dev.) 
Income threshold  No. 
Obs.  
Low income  0.50 
(0.24) 
y<24,999  151  
Middle Income  0.54 
(0.22) 
25,000<y<89,999  434  
High Income  0.55 
(0.26) 
y>90,000  192  
All Groups  0.54 
(0.24) 
All reported  777  
Source: ANES (2004) 
 
In this paper I present a three class model of elections. The setup is characterized by a 
middle class with heterogeneous preferences which may be similar to other income 
groups; where contributions by rich individuals may have more impact on policies 
than contributions by the middle class; and where participation rates may vary with 
income. Despite these "disadvantages" I show under which conditions a larger or 
more powerful middle class generates less extreme outcomes, measured as policy 
deviations from the median voter's most preferred policy. 
 
The model relies on campaign contributions and voting as two ways of influencing 
candidate's policy proposals. In particular, the model endogenously generates two 
opposing forces, where money from campaign contributions drives policies towards 




policies towards the center. The interaction of these two forces will generate different 
policy outcomes given different distributions of income. 
 
The results indicate that the middle class is relevant as a force towards centrist 
policies, playing three distinctive roles in mitigating extreme outcomes. The first and 
obvious role is that a larger middle class implies more votes; and if, as documented in 
the literature (e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980), participation rates vary with 
income, a larger middle class increases the power of votes relative to money. The 
second role is less obvious: an increase in the strength of the middle class may 
actually reduce contributions per-se, or the relative power of contributions compared 
to votes. Finally, in an environment where I allow the rich group to be biased, both a 
larger and richer middle class bring policies closer to the center, by bringing the 
money induced "political center" closer to the median voter's preferred policy. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature that 
most closely relates to this paper. In section 3 the benchmark model is set up. Section 
4 looks at changes in income distributions in the basic framework. Sections 5 and 6 
introduce alternative specifications and discuss these results. Finally section 7 
concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper relates to two different strands of the literature. First it is related to 




policy outcomes in particular. Within this strand this paper is related more closely to 
the literature on the effects of the middle class on policy outcomes. The paper also is 
related to the literature on how contributions affect electoral outcomes. This paper 
falls closer to papers that look at how money affects policy positions/outcomes of 
elections. 
 
Within the first strand, the literature often argues that a large middle class is a 
necessary condition for political stability and democracy (e.g. Lipset, 1959). From the 
political perspective, the middle class serves as a buffer between the rich and the 
poor, hence promoting higher stability in democratic regimes, or facilitating 
transitions to democracy as modeled by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The middle 
class in this view is necessary for stability since they crave freedoms of speech and 
expression, but do not want major expropriation of private property that would come 
from a revolution. Thus the middle class will support the establishment of a 
democracy, and will be willing to redistribute some income to the poor to avoid a 
revolution and to obtain economic and political freedoms in exchange. In this way 
they become a buffer between the rich and the poor. There is certainly some empirical 
support for this view. As mentioned earlier Easterly (2001), while studying the so-
called middle class consensus, finds that a stronger middle class also has a positive 
effect on democratic stability. Unfortunately Easterly (2001) only focuses on a proxy 
for middle class strength while assuming its size is constant37
                                                 
37 Other studies define the middle class in different ways, but do not attempt to explore the effects of 
the middle class on policy outcomes. For example Birdsall et al. (2000) has a framework to look at 
changes in the size of the middle class, defined as the group with income between 75%-125% of the 






In addition in this story, political stability is threatened mostly by the demise of 
democracy itself and Easterly (2001) only tangentially looks at the stability of 
policies or stability within the democratic system. 
 
In general the literature has made few attempts at looking at the effect of the middle 
class on policy outcomes. Most papers that look at the effects of the income 
distribution rely on some version of the Meltzer & Richards (1981) model to look at 
the effects on redistribution policies. Borck (2007) summarizes the results of this kind 
of model under the basic framework and several extensions. These models ask if 
higher inequality leads to more or less redistribution of income via taxes and 
government spending. The basic framework predicts higher inequality leading to 
higher redistribution, but there is little empirical support for this prediction in the 
papers Borck surveyed. This motivates alternative explanations of why inequality 
does not lead to higher redistribution. 
 
The main alternative explanations rely on one of the following ideas: 
 
1. Political participation is different for different income groups, either because 
of differences in voting patterns or due to contributions that may end up 
weighting votes differently.(Benabou, 2000; Rodriguez, 2004; Campante, 
2008). 
                                                                                                                                           
that has income between US$2-US$10 a day PPP for a group of low and middle income countries. 




2. Redistribution is via taxes which can be avoided/evaded, and thus the actual 
redistribution is less than the "desired" redistribution. (Borck, 2003; 
Rodriguez, 2004; Roine 2006). 
3. Citizens do not want redistribution of income since they believe in the 
potential of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis, and therefore high taxes 
may affect one in the future (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Harms and Zink, 2003; 
Bartels, 2007). 
 
While all these are plausible explanations they do not look explicitly at the middle 
class and its role. There are a few exceptions. For example, Harms and Zink (2003) 
numerically show how the middle class can tip the scale of redistribution one way or 
the other. Zink (2005) shows how the middle class can in fact prevent higher 
economic growth and equality, by constraining access to higher education for the 
poor, since this policy increases the returns from education for the middle class. 
Gruner and Schils (2007) present a three class model to look at redistribution policies 
in which the middle class becomes the pivotal group favoring more or less 
redistribution depending on the benefits it entails to them as a group. Finally Roemer 
(2001) presents a model in which the middle class can affect policies (tax and 
spending) by becoming the pivotal group in a three class framework, and thus bring 
policies in line with their own preferred platforms. 
 
One important problem with all of these models is that they either assume that the 




class consists of a group with similar policy preferences, which in most cases "lie 
between the rich and the poor". As was mentioned above, the evidence indicates that 
the middle class is not necessarily homogenous in policy preferences. The second 
problem with this literature is that it does not directly explore the two different 
margins that may define a middle class: its size and its strength. By size I mean the 
fraction of middle class citizens, and by strength I mean the income of the middle 
class relative to the rich. Why do we want to look at these two different margins? If 
the middle class only participates in politics by voting, then the size of the middle 
class may be enough to explain the effect they have on electoral outcomes. A small 
middle class would thus have fewer votes and therefore would have to compromise 
policies into some other coalition to obtain some policy benefits. A large middle class 
in contrast may be able to obtain the policies they prefer without compromising them. 
However if the middle class can also affect policies by contributing to political 
campaigns, then a small but rich middle class may have a significant effect on the 
policies offered by politicians and the consequent electoral/policy outcomes. 
 
The second strand of the literature that this paper relates to concerns the effects of 
contributions on electoral outcomes. The literature on campaign contributions is 
needless to say extensive. Grossman and Helpman (2001), Persson and Tabellini 






In particular the model of this paper fits within the tradition of models where 
contributions lead towards more extreme outcomes. There are many models in the 
literature (e.g. Austen-Smith 1987; Ball (1999); Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental 
and Ben-Zion 1975 and Welch 1974, 1981 are a few examples) that capture this idea 
of money driving policies away from the ideological center. Mueller (2003) has a 
good summary of the forces involved. However most of these models assume that 
those with money have a preference that is located in the extreme, rather than 
deriving this result endogenously. Special interest group models such as those 
presented in Grossman and Helpman (2001) are a particular case. Coate (2004a, 
2004b) also presents models where the money is located towards the extremes of the 
political spectrum. Glazer and Gradstein (2005) present a model in which they 
endogenously derive that citizens located at the extremes contribute more than those 
in the center. The form of the utility function is crucial for generating this outcome. In 
fact as will be seen, the model I present does not require those at the extreme to 
contribute more to obtain divergence from the center. 
 
In summary this paper allows us to fill the following gaps in the literature. 
Concerning the first strand of the literature, the model presented here generates the 
result of a middle class generating policy closer to the center of the political spectrum 
without assuming that the middle class is ideologically "in the political center". The 
model also allows us to distinguish between two characteristics of the middle class, 
its size and its strength as their effects on the policy outcomes. With regard to the 




the result of money driving policies to the extremes, without assuming that the money 
is located in the "political extremes". 
3. Benchmark Model 
 
I first set up a simple model where money and votes interact to determine optimal 
policy platforms, where agents differ only in policy preferences. I will later introduce 




The setup follows the probabilistic voting model framework. The voter has single 
peaked policy preferences τj over policies τ drawn from a uniform CDF F(·) over the 
interval [0,1]. The voter observes two candidates' policy proposals and chooses to 
contribute or not to each of them based on the policies proposed by each candidate 
and their own preferred policy. I'll assume that contributions from an individual 
contributor j to candidate k (which is the candidate closest to her preferred policy) are 
given by the following function:38
 
 
𝑚𝑗 = 𝑤 − 𝑐�𝜏𝑗 − 𝜏𝑘� + 𝛽�𝜏𝑗 − 𝜏𝑘′�    (1) 
 
                                                 
38 One way of rationalizing this framework is to think that voters are political consumers and as such 
decide to consume political goods as proposed by Ansolabehere, et al (2003). These goods may be 
voting and contributing to campaigns. Let voters dispose of a certain amount of resources w to 
consumption of political goods. If voting is costly in the sense that voting for candidates with policy 
platforms that are further away from the ones preferred by the voter is costlier, then contributions will 




given platforms τk and τk’ proposed by parties k and k′, where (w+β) is the maximum 
amount someone would ever contribute.39
 
 
I assume that both w and β can be increasing functions of income y, thus w′(y)>0 and 
β′(y)>0. All voters/contributor initially are assumed to have the same income y. The 
contribution function has the following properties: 
 
a) It is decreasing in the distance between the policy proposed by the candidate 
and the most preferred policy of any citizen. 
b) It increases with the distance between the two candidates. 
c) It is increasing in w, where w′(y) can be thought of as the fixed marginal 
propensity to contribute. 
 
Note that b) directly generates an incentive for candidates to differentiate from the 
other candidate, driving policies away from each other as a centrifugal force. This is 
captured by the parameter β. 
 
I will show in Proposition 1 how a) can increase the centrifugal force. This is 
captured by the parameter c. So we can think that contributions have two 
components: a fixed amount w that does not depend on the proposed policies and a 
variable amount (which can be positive or negative) that depends on the platforms 
                                                 
39 This is the amount someone with most preferred policy τj =0 would choose to contribute to the party 





proposed by the candidates. The fixed portion will actually drive policies towards the 





Candidates propose policy platforms τk and τk’ and run for office. Denoting the two 
parties as R and L, I'll assume for simplicity that τR≥τL. Candidates differ only in their 
policy platforms; thus all agents with τj<((τR+τL)/2) will contribute/vote for L, while 
all agents with τj>((τR+τL)/2) will contribute/vote for R. Therefore for a voter with 
income y we have that total expected contributions for each party are given by: 
 









Where 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 𝜏
𝑅+𝜏𝐿
2
 and integrating the expressions yields the following two 
contribution functions: 
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𝑀𝑅(𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝐿) = 𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟) − 𝛽
2
[(𝜏𝑅)2−2(𝜖) − (𝜏𝐿)2]− 𝑐
2









With 𝜖 = 𝜏𝑅 − 𝜏𝐿. Therefore total contributions for each candidate are a function of 
the platform choices by both candidates and the behavioral parameters w, c, and β. 
Ceteris paribus increasing w or β will increase total contributions, and an increase in c 
will decrease total contributions. A higher w implies a higher propensity to contribute 
regardless of the candidates, while a higher β represents the marginal distaste for the 
"other" candidates policy. Finally a higher c means a higher marginal distaste for the 
contributor's preferred candidate. 
 
I will assume for now that contributions do not affect electoral outcomes directly, but 
rather are pocketed by the candidate40
 
. This is done for illustrative purposes, since we 
allow for contributions to play a more significant role in a following section. Hence 
candidates will be office motivated but will also desire contributions. Thus the 
objective function for a candidate from party k is to maximize her expected utility: 
𝑈𝑘 = 𝑊(𝑀𝑘) + Ω ∙ 𝑉𝑘     (4) 
 
with W a function that maps expected money into the utility function with W′>0, Ω 
are office derived benefits and Vk is the probability of being elected. Then 
substituting R and L for k the respective utility functions for each candidate are given 
by: 
 
                                                 
40 Glazer and Gradstein (2005) present a model in which candidates seek to maximize contributions 

















To keep things simple I assume that W(M)=M for the rest of the model; thus money is 
quasilinear in this utility function. This assumption allows us to obtain some 
interesting closed form solutions and does not affect the substance of the game or the 
main results. The reason is that as long as money increases the utility of the candidate 
she has an incentive to move her platform such to maximize the amount of money she 
receives. This changes only qualitatively if we choose a more sophisticated form for 
W(M). 
 
Benchmark: Median Voter Theorem (MVT) 
 
Lets first look at the case in which money doesn't affect the utility of candidates, i.e. 
W(M)=0. Given that each voter has single peaked preferences and assuming everyone 
votes, the unique equilibrium is the median voter theorem. This is, both parties 
converge to the median voter (τL=τR=1/2), this platform is implemented and each 
party is elected with probability one half. The proof is trivial since this game is the 





Only money matters (extremism) 
 
Now assume the opposite case where only money matters to candidates, not the 
election's outcome. In this setting the second argument in (5) and (6) is shut down (or 
Ω=0) and thus candidates only want to maximize monetary contributions. This yields 
the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: If w<c+β then policies will be polarized when candidates only care 
about maximizing contributions. 
 
Proof. Taking first order conditions for (2) with  resp ect to  τL and imposing 
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      (8) 
 
Combining (7) and (8) we obtain the following optimal platforms for each 
candidate: 
                                                 
41 Second order conditions for maxima hold since 𝜕
2𝑈𝑘
�𝜕𝜏𝑘�







       (9) 
 
𝜏𝑅 = 1 − 2𝑤+𝑐
4𝛽+6𝑐
                 (10) 
 
If w-β<c then τL<1/2 and τR>1/2 so that money generates a desire to locate away 
from the center. Note that this holds even assuming that if candidates converge to 
the same platform they still receive money. On the other hand, if w-β>c then 
τL>1/2 and τR<1/2, thus violating the condition that τR≥τL. Hence in that case 
money does not exert a polarizing force42
 
. ■ 
The intuition behind the result is that as the candidate moves away from the center 
(holding the other candidate's platform constant), two things occur. First extreme 
contributors will increase their contributions since they are now "closer" to the 
candidate's platform, while centrist contributors will reduce their contributions since 
they are now further away from the policy proposed by the candidate. Second, as the 
platform choice of the candidate moves away from the "other" candidate, the highest 
contribution by any contributor increases. 
 
                                                 
42 In what follows I will refer to polarizing or centrifugal forces interchangeably. The idea is that when 
money makes candidates move away from each other it acts as a centrifugal force; bringing thing away 
from the center. Pure voting on the other hand will act as a centripetal force bringing candidates closer 





Figure 3 shows the profile of contributions for different choices of L, assuming R 
chooses τR =1/2. In Figure 4, the purple area on the right represents the loss of 
contributions from moving away from the center (from τL =1/2 to τL =0.4) while the 
red area on top represents the gains from moving away from the center. As can be 
observed, in this figure the gains from moving away from the center offset the losses. 
 
 Figure 3: Profile of contributions for L from each contributor 
Profile of contribution for L
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In the case in which the contribution rate falls slowly (i.e. small c) with the distance 
between candidate and voter, moving away from the center will not yield significant 
additional contributions43
                                                 
43 Think of the extreme with c=β=0. Everyone contributes the same, so there is no gain from moving 
away from the center. 
. However if c is large, then moving to the extreme 
increases contributions by those contributor closer to the edge, while reducing those 
from contributors in the center. The condition w-β<c ensures that the gains from 
moving to the extreme more than offset the losses from moving in that direction. The 
reason for this is that the rate at which contributions are falling by moving away from 
the center is outweighed by the increase in the contributions received from all 
contributors now that candidates begin to differentiate. Note that although assuming 




from each other) increases the centrifugal force of money, it is actually not necessary 
to achieve the policy differentiation. Thus even if β=0 we can obtain the policy 
differentiation if w<c. 
 
Combining money and votes. 
 
We now combine money and votes and observe both effects interacting with each 
other. Under certain parameter values more money implies stronger centrifugal 
forces, while more votes always imply stronger centripetal forces. Thus candidates R 

















       (12) 
 
The solution to (11) and (12) will yield policy or best response functions τR(τL) and 
τL(τR) such that each candidate will have an optimal policy choice for each policy the 




       (13) 
𝜏𝑅 = 1 − 2(𝑤+Ω)+𝑐
4𝛽+6𝑐





which are equivalent to (9) and (10), except that they include the value of being in 
office. This generates the second result. 
 
Proposition 2: Policies will be closer to the center as the value of being in office 
increases. 
 
Proof. This arises directly from expressions (13) and (14), in which a higher 
value for office Ω implies a platform closer to the median voter. ■ 
 
As expected we have to opposing forces to deal with. On one hand money plays a 
centrifugal role (assuming of course w-β<c), while votes play a centripetal force. We 
get policy divergence from the center if and only if w+Ω-β<c. So in order to have 
divergence from the center, c now has to be larger than if candidates only care about 
money. 
 
Proposition 3: A higher fixed amount of contributions w induces convergence to the 
center. 
 
Proof. This arises directly from expressions (13) and (14), with contributions 
w bringing the platforms closer to the median voter. ■ 
 
The result is entirely explained by the fact that if contributions are fixed, then there is 




like votes, in which all citizens have the same influence, so that the median voter 
theorem is more likely to hold. 
 
This result might be counter-intuitive, but recall that money induces more extreme 
platforms only if w-β<c. Thus increasing w will imply less deviation from the median 
voter. However it must be noted that we are keeping β and c constant. Note that if the 
variable components of contributions (β and c) change then this drives policies 




= −2(𝑤+Ω)+𝑐(2𝛽+3𝑐)2 < 0      (15) 
𝜕𝜏𝐿
𝜕𝑐
= 𝛽−3𝑤(2𝛽+3𝑐)2 ≷ 0      (16) 
 
where (15) is always negative while (16) is negative iff β<3w. Thus an increase in the 
rate at which contributions decrease with policy distance c will drive policies to the 
extreme if and only if the value of β∈[w-c,3w]. The lower bound comes from 
Proposition 1, while the upper bound arises from (16). 
 
So in summary we know that under certain conditions money will drive policies to 
the extremes. If contributors value differentiation (β) more, then we have more 
extreme outcomes. An increase in the fixed part of contributions w achieves the 
opposite effect. Finally the rate at which contributions decrease plays the same role as 






We can now turn to distributive issues to look at the effects of the distribution of 
income on the outcome of policies. 
4. Distributional issues 
 
In this section I proceed in the following way. I introduce the income distribution by 
generating three different groups of income which I will denote as poor with a 
population share αp; middle class (share of αm) and rich (share of αr=1-αp-αm). Each 
group has average incomes of yp<ym<yr respectively. In order to simplify notation I 
assume that yp=φym and ym=δyr. Moreover I assume that αr remains constant, so 
changes in the distribution will come from either changing average income 
differences (δ or φ) or substituting poor for middle class agents (αp for αm). Finally I 
assume that all income groups share the same distributions of policy preferences F(τ). 
 
The rest of the model remains the same; candidates choose a policy platform and 
voters contribute and vote for the candidate closest to their most preferred policy. I 
am interested in looking at changes in the distribution holding average income 
constant, so any changes assume that the average income y does not change. I do this 
by scaling all incomes such that y remains constant, as it is shown below. 
 





Arguably income could affect all three parameters in the individual contribution 
function (w, β and c). To keep things relatively simple I assume that income can 
affect the "fixed portion" w of contributions or the variable component β. Given these 
assumptions we can rewrite expressions (2) and (3) such total contributions for both 
candidates will now be given by: 
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𝑀𝑅(𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝐿) = 𝑤�(1 − 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟) − 𝛽
�
2
[(𝜏𝑅)2−2(𝜖) − (𝜏𝐿)2]− 𝑐
2






Where 𝑤� = 𝛼𝑝𝑤𝑝 + 𝛼𝑚𝑤𝑚 + 𝛼𝑟𝑤𝑟, and 𝛽� = 𝛼𝑝𝛽𝑝 + 𝛼𝑚𝛽𝑚 + 𝛼𝑟𝛽𝑟, represent the 
weighted average of "fixed" and variable contributions respectively and where 
wp(yp)<wm(ym)<wr(yr) and βp(yp)<βm(ym)<βr(yr) correspond to fixed and variable 
contribution parameters from each income group and which will be increasing in 
income. Solving the optimal location problem for each candidate yields the following 




       (19) 
𝜏𝑅 = 1 − 2(𝑤�+Ω)+𝑐
4𝛽�+6𝑐





Using (19) and (20) we can look at comparative statics of how changes in the 
distribution of income affect policy platforms. I assume total average income of the 
economy remains constant using the following procedure. Denote the average income 
y. Then: 




Δ = 𝛼𝑝𝜙𝛿 + 𝛼𝑚𝛿 + 𝛼𝑟        (22) 
 





;    𝑦𝑚 =
𝛿𝑦
Δ
;     𝑦𝑝 =
𝜙𝛿𝑦
Δ
     (23) 
 
In this way changes that affect any parameter of the model will be offset by adjusting 
the parameter Δ to keep average income constant. For example a change in αm, will 
be accompanied by a change in αp to keep total population constant, but also by a 
change of these two parameters in Δ to keep average income constant. 
 
We now look at three changes in the distribution of income: a) an increase in the size 
of the middle class (while reducing the size of the poor group); b) an increase in the 



















































 >0 while 𝜕𝜏
𝐿
𝜕𝛽�
 <0. So we know that the net effect on policies will always 
be given by the struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal forces. Finally in 
order to make comparative statics easier I will impose the following functional forms: 












      (27) 
 
and we can find similar expressions for (25) and (26). The parameter φ represents the 
strength of the centrifugal motive of money. A high value of φ implies that higher 
contributions will lead towards more extreme platforms, whereas a lower value 
indicates the opposite. 
 
With this in mind I look at the effects of changes in the income distribution first on 





Effect of the size of the middle class on contributions 
 
I first look at changing the size of the middle class and its effects on contributions. 













�  (28) 
 
The first term in the brackets of represents the substitution effect from having more 
middle class and fewer poor agents, since an increase in αm, will ensue a reduction in 
αp of the same magnitude. The second term in brackets can also be thought as the 
income effect that arises from increasing the number of middle class citizens while 
keeping average income constant. If average income is held constant then an increase 
in the share of the middle class will decrease the per-capita income of each income 
group. Mechanically, since φδ<δ, an increase in αm matched by an offsetting 
reduction in αp increases Δ, which recalling (23) reduces yr, ym and yp for a given y. 
The net effect on w will depend on the specific parameters of the economy. In 
particular, assuming w(y)=ρyλ with λ>1 yields the following proposition44
 
. 
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where Δ� = 𝛼𝑝(𝜙𝛿)𝜆 + 𝛼𝑚𝛿𝜆 + 𝛼𝑟. 
 
Proof. In appendix. ■ 
 
 
If (29) holds then the substitution effect dominates the income effect and so a larger 
middle class generates a larger contributor base. 
 
Corollary 1: Increasing the size of the middle class yields more contributions if: 
a) 𝛼𝑚 ≤ 𝛼�𝑚 
b) or 𝛼𝑚 > 𝛼�𝑚 and 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿̅ 
c) or 𝛼𝑚 > 𝛼�𝑚,  𝛿 > 𝛿̅  and 𝜙 ≥ 𝜙� 
where 𝛼�𝑚, 𝛿̅ and 𝜙� are given threshold levels. 
 
Proof. In appendix. ■ 
 
This corollary comes from applying comparative statics to (29). The intuition is that if 
the middle class is very small, then the income effect will be small, since increases in 
αm will have small effects on Δ. If the middle class is large but δ is small, then the 
poor and the middle class will both be poor enough such that contributions from them 
won’t matter much, again since the effect of an increase in αm on Δ is small. Finally if 




substituting one group for the other should not have any significant effect. In all cases 
the intuition is basically the same: if the substitution effect is larger than the income 
effect, then more contributions will rise. 
 
Next we look at the effect of the income of the middle class. 
 
Effect of Income of the middle class on contributions 
 
Now I take the partial derivative of w with respect to δ assuming that φ falls so that φδ 
does not change: thus the middle class incomes becomes closer to the rich and farther 
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in which we know that the second term in brackets is always positive, while the other 
two terms are always negative due to the income effect45
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The sign of (31) is ambiguous. If the rich group contributes significantly more than 
the middle class (𝑤𝑚 ≪ 𝑤𝑟, either due to a high income differential or large λ) then 
an increase in the income of the middle class may reduce total contributions. 
Alternatively if middle class income is already close to the rich, then increasing their 
income relative to the rich will increase total contributions. 
 
Proposition 5: Increasing the income of the middle class yields higher contributions 
iff: 
(∆ − 𝛼𝑚𝛿)∆�> ∆𝛼𝑟      (32) 
 
Proof. In appendix. ■ 
 
The intuition is again largely the same. The condition in (32) ensures that the effect of 
raising middle class income offsets the effect of reducing the incomes of the rich and 
poor combined. 
 
Corollary 2: Increasing the income of the middle class yields higher contributions if: 
a) 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿 
b) 𝛿 < 𝛿 and 𝛼𝑚 ≥ 𝛼�𝑚 
where 𝛼�𝑚 and 𝛿 are given threshold levels. 
 





Where the intuition is now given by the fact that if δ is high then they are very similar 
to the rich. Thus an increase in their income will offset the reduction in the income of 
the rich and thus increase total contributions. However if the middle class is not so 
rich, an increase in their income may still increase total contributions if the middle 
class is large enough, therefore again increasing their income offsets the reduction in 
the income of the rich thus increasing total contributions. 
As a matter of completeness I also look at the effect of increasing the income of the 
poor. 
 
Effect of income of the poor on contributions 
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And again we observe that changes in the relative income of the poor may have 




income will reduce total contributions, while if the poor are already close to the other 
groups, then the opposite result might appear. 
 
Effects of Income distribution on policy outcomes 
 
With the previous results in hand, I can now present the following summary 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 6: A larger (or richer) middle class will moderate extreme outcomes if a 
larger (or richer) middle class decreases total contributions and lower contributions 
lead towards less extreme outcomes (high φ). 
 
Proof. Combining a high value of φ for (27) and assuming that (29) (or (32)) 
does not hold obtains the result. ■ 
 
Thus when looking at the effects of the size middle class on policy outcomes, we 
cannot a priori pin down the effect of a larger (or richer) middle class. However for 
given parameters we can do so. In fact both corollaries show us that parameterizations 
that achieve this outcome exist. Perhaps the more difficult task is to assess if φ takes 
a high or low value. The empirical evidence suggests that as income rises, so does 
contributions but also access to information (Bartels, 2007). Thus, richer individuals 
tend to be more informed about politics. This would suggest that φ should be high, 




the variable part β does. Therefore more information should only affect contributions 
through β, while higher income could affect both w and β. 
 
The key observation to obtain this result is that a larger or richer middle class must 
make contributions less important; this is shifting the power from money to votes, and 
therefore make extreme outcomes less likely. 
5. Distributional issues with differential voting patterns 
 
So far we have looked at the impact of income distribution assuming that voting is 
unaffected by income. However there is significant empirical evidence (e.g. 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980 and Table 3) that suggests higher voter turnout 
correlates with higher income. Thus I will introduce differential voting patterns into 
the model. A simple way of achieving this is to assume that only a fraction of voters 
of each group vote. Thus let pp<pm<pr be the probability of casting a vote for poor, 
middle class and rich voters respectively, and assume that voting propensities are 
independent of voters' policy positions. Thus turnout will be given by 
Φ=αppp+αmpm+αrpr, and thus the utilities for candidates R and L are now: 
 
















Table 3: Voting and Contributing by Income Group (2004 Election) 
Group  % Vot e   % Contribute  Income threshold  No. Obs  
Low income  52.9  4.6  y<24,999  151  
Middle Income  73.0  6.6  25,000<y<89,999  434  
High Income  75.5  18.2  y>90,000  192  
All Groups  69.7  9.1  All reported  777  
Source: ANES (2004) 
 
In order to distinguish the effect of voting turnout and contribution turnout I assume 
that turnout only affects votes and not contributions. Thus I continue to assume that 
contributions follow the form of (17) and (18). Under these conditions, the optimal 




      (36) 
𝜏𝑅 = 1 − 2(𝑤�+ΩΦ)+𝑐
4𝛽�+6𝑐
                 (37) 
 
    Looking at (36) and (37) it is simple to observe that the effects of income 
distribution will now change, since the size of each group affects not only w but also 
Φ. However, since δ and φ do not affect Φ, only the impact of αm will differ from 





Proposition 7: If voter turnout is increasing in income and the benefits from holding 
office are large, a larger middle class (combined with fewer poor) always moderates 
policy outcomes. 
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�𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝� > 0. Thus (38) will now be positive 
if the benefits of holding office are large enough. Thus now a large middle 
class provides an explicit force through votes towards more centrist policies. ■ 
 
The intuition behind these results is that a larger middle class will now imply more 
votes as turnout will increase. Nevertheless a larger middle class will still affect 
contributions. If "fixed" contributions increase, then the voting effect is reinforced 
and a larger middle class induces more centrist policies. On the other hand, if a larger 
middle class induces less "fixed" contributions, then a larger middle class may 
generate a centripetal or centrifugal force. However if the benefits from holding 







I look now at two different extensions of the model. First I look at what happens 
when we assume that the rich group may have biased preferences, so their average 
bliss point is not centered at 1/2, but at some other value. Then, I explore a more 
sophisticated version of the model in which money affects election outcomes, rather 
than just enriching candidates. As we will see neither extensions overturns the basic 




In order to keep things relatively simple, assume that both poor and middle class 
voters continue to have policy preferences drawn from the uniform distribution over 
the [0,1] interval. But now let the rich group be biased, such that they are uniformly 
distributed over the interval [τc-ε, τc+ε], where τc≥1/2 is the preferred policy of the 






Figure 5: Distribution of policy Preferences by Income Group 
 
Note that the median voter is now given by the following expression: 
 
 𝜏𝑚𝑣 = 1
2





Under the MVT framework with money having no effect, the result would be for 
candidates to converge towards τmv. However money can also play a new role, 
namely, to move the convergence point away from τmv. In order to capture this we 
need to introduce a few new elements. Let τmc be the median contributor, defined as 
the platform such that both candidates would obtain the same amount of money if 
both chose τmc. Money contributed by poor and middle class will still be governed by 
(2) and (3). Therefore we need only to find the money raised by the rich, which for 
each party will be given by: 
𝑀𝑟𝐿(𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝐿) =
𝑤𝑟
2𝜀
(𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟 − 𝜏𝐶 + 𝜀) + 𝛽𝑟[𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟𝜖]−
𝑐
2




�           (39) 
𝑀𝑟𝑅(𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝐿) =
𝑤𝑟
2𝜀
(𝜏𝐶 + 𝜀 − 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟) − 𝛽𝑟[𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑟𝜖 − 𝜖] −
𝑐
2




�  (40) 
 
Thus total contributions for each party are given by: 
 
𝑀𝐿(𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝐿) = 𝛼𝑝𝑀𝑝𝐿 + 𝛼𝑚𝑀𝑚𝐿 + 𝛼𝑟𝑀𝑟𝐿 
 





So equal money for both candidates implies that τmv < τmc < τc (assuming the same 
platform). Now if both candidates only care about maximizing contributions we can 
get one of two scenarios: a) Both candidates converge to the same policy platform, 
namely τmc; and b) both candidates choose different policies but attain the same 
amount of money. In this case the candidates will not be located symmetrically from 
the center (τmv). In fact, given that τc>1/2, R will optimally choose some platform to 
the right of τmc, while L will choose a platform on the other side. However since only 
money matters, there is an incentive for candidates to move towards where the elite 
group is located and hence get more money from this group. Thus both candidates 
have a incentive to move towards the elite, and thus they will not locate 
symmetrically46
 
. The consequence is that R will obtain relatively more funding from 
the rich group, while L will get relatively more funds from the middle class and poor 
group. 
The size and relative income of the middle class play two different roles in this 
version of the model. First a larger middle class reduces the effectiveness of the rich, 
biasing the convergence platform, since one can show that 𝜕𝜏
𝑚𝑐
𝜕𝛼𝑚
< 0. Similarly, 
increasing the relative income of the middle class will also generate the same effect, 
namely reducing the bias of the convergence platform towards the rich. 
 
                                                 
46 If they located symmetrically with respect to the median voter, then L would be further away from 
the median contributor, and would receive fewer contributions. If they located symmetrically from the 
median rich voter, they would obtain the same amount of money from the rich group, but L would 




Introducing votes into the model will have the centripetal effects mentioned earlier, 
although the convergence will be towards a policy platform between the median voter 
and the median contributor. The reason for this is that R will face a trade-off of 
moving away from the median voter towards the median contributor to get more 
money at the cost of losing votes. L may follow suit, and thus the new convergence 
platform will be to the right of τmv. We can denote this new platform τ* and call it the 
effective (money induced) median voter platform. 
 
Given this notation we can now introduce the concept of a money induced political 
distortion. Let Γ = τ* - τmv be the money induced political distortion. It is simple to 
show that income inequality will increase the political distortion. 
 
Proposition 8: A larger or richer middle class reduces the political distortion 
 












where the second term 𝜕𝜏
𝑚𝑣
𝜕𝛼𝑚
= 0 always, since we continue to assume 
substitution of middle class for poor voters. Now, 𝜕𝜏
∗
𝜕𝛼𝑚
 is less than zero, since 
















since τmv is not affected by δ. Again, an increase in δ reduces τmc, since as 
before the relative income of the middle class will have a greater importance 
than the income of the rich, thus bringing τmc closer to τmv, and consequently 
reducing Γ. ■ 
 
The intuition is straightforward. As the middle class grows in size or income, their 
mean bliss-point (1/2) becomes relatively more important compared to the rich's 
mean bliss-point (τc) in determining policy outcomes. 
 
Money affecting turnout 
 
We now let money to affect election outcomes. I therefore modify the model so that 
money is used to increase voter turnout rather than just going to the candidate's 
coffers. Following Campante (2008) I assume that money can be used to attract voters 
to the polls47
I further assume that candidates use money to target voters that prefer them to the 
other candidate, but who otherwise might not vote at all. The idea is that campaigns 
. I also assume that money only affects turnout of the poor voters. Thus, 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑀) 
                                                 
47 Nichter (2008) coins the term turnout buying in which money in politics can be used to increase 





can identify potential voters and use money encourage them to vote. Of course they 
could target a voter with preferences closer to the other candidate, but in general this 
should not be the case. 
 
Thus from now on I assume that pm=pr=1 and pp=P(M), with P′>0 and P′′<0, 
lim𝑀→∞ 𝑃(𝑀) = 1, and P(0)=0. The probability of casting a vote is increasing in 
money, but the marginal return is decreasing. Therefore the candidates use money to 
attract potential supporters (prospective voters with preferences closer to the 
candidate spending the money) to vote, thus increasing turnout. This implies that the 
utility function of each candidate is now given by: 
 









So money does no longer enter the utility function directly. Under this new 
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The first term represents the marginal benefits of moving "away" from the center, 




poor voters. The second term is the marginal cost of moving away from the center, 
which is given by the resulting votes lost to the other candidate. The net result will 














To get somewhat more clear results let us assume that P(M)=1-e-M. 
 











𝑅 � > 0 
 
Comparing this result with the equation that solves 𝜕𝑀
𝑅
𝜕𝜏𝑅
= 0 from (3), we know that 
now our optimal platform will be closer to the center, compared to the case where 
money enters directly into the candidate's utility function. Thus we have again that 
votes generate a centripetal effect. We therefore have the following: 
 
Proposition 9: An increase in the size of the middle class (reducing the poor group) 
reduces extreme outcomes. 
 
Proof. In appendix. ■ 
 
The intuition is the same as before: while a larger middle class can increase or 




that the middle class brings in offsets the effect of money, then a larger middle class 
will bring policies closer to the center. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
 
This paper presents a three class model of heterogeneous agents to look at the effects 
of income distribution on electoral outcomes. The model relies on campaign 
contributions as the mechanism by which contributors, and thus different income 
groups, can influence candidate's platforms and bring electoral results closer to their 
preferred policies. Money in this case generates a centrifugal force driving candidates 
away from each other. Votes as in the usual Downsian model generate the opposite 
effect of bringing policies closer to the center. 
 
The middle class in this model plays a buffer role as in other models (e.g. Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006), but in this case my definition of the middle class is less 
restrictive since I allow for heterogeneity in policy preferences among the middle 
class. I am also able to distinguish between the size (in numbers) and the strength (in 
dollars) of the middle class. 
 
The model also allows me to look at particular changes in the distribution of income 
and their effects on policy outcomes. In particular I show how a large middle class 
can have a positive effect in moderating electoral policies, and how the difference in 
income between the rich and the rest can also affect policies. In fact by doing this the 




summary the paper supports the idea that both a larger and more powerful middle 
class can reduce policy extremism. 
 
A theoretical extension worth exploring is to allow money to affect contributions as 
well (for example the proportion of contributors within a group of income), 
generating a bandwagon effect in which money brings more money, and thus 
generating a new equilibrium. Another set of extensions is to look at the effects of 





Chapter 3: Chile, the Unbearable Burden of Inequality 
   “Aquí hay dos Chile….y yo odio al otro”   
(Response of a young demonstrator to a reporter inquiring why 
he was vandalizing private and public property during one of 
the many violent protests in downtown Santiago in 2006)  
1. Introduction 
 
While the first part of the above dramatic statement (“here we have two countries…”) 
by a young student protester may apply to many countries, in few of them it is so 
obviously apparent. This is reflected in both the ample statistical evidence (to be 
discussed in detail in the next section) and in the normal routine of daily life in 
Santiago or elsewhere in the country. Chile has one of the least equal wealth 
distributions in the world with an estimated household income Gini coefficient of the 
order of 0.57 according to the most recent available estimates (CASEN, 2003). The 
total (after tax) income of the richest 10% of the households is larger than the total 
income of the poorest 80% of the households! Income differentials among the lower 
80% of the population are rather modest with average income differences among 
deciles two to eight in all cases below 24%. However, a much bigger jump occurs 
between the income deciles eight and nine (51%) and a whopping 198% jump occurs 
between deciles nine and 10 (Figure 6) 48
                                                 
48 Figure 6 is based on the latest fully available national household survey (CASEN), which 
corresponds to 2003. For 2006, only preliminary aggregate results have been released so far. The Gini 
coefficient released for 2006 is 0.54. Still this does not give evidence of a change in trend for 




supported quite well by the statistical evidence, the “poor” and relatively egalitarian 
Chile comprised by 80% or 90% of the population and the remaining 10% of the 
population constituting the “developed” Chile49
 
. 
The second part of the statement (“….and I hate the other one”) is a corollary of the 
first, presumably magnified in a context of frustrated expectations.  The key issue is 
that the two countries metaphor is not any less true today than it was at the beginning 
of democracy seventeen years ago. Democracy followed, coincidentally, an also 
seventeen year long regime that was arguably among the most repressive and pro-
elite that any country in Latin America has ever experienced. As we show below, the 
profound wealth and income gulf existing today between the top 10% of the country 
and everyone else has not decreased50
 
. 
The successive democratic governments over seventeen years have been unable 
and/or unwilling to reduce inequality despite a generalized perception of a society 
that is utterly unjust. At the onset of democracy the unequal wealth distribution was 
regarded merely as a result of right wing policies enacted by the dictatorial regime 
                                                                                                                                           
inequality. Other measures for the GINI index may vary slightly. WIDER (2007) and Chen and 
Ravallion (2004), which are the most comprehensive datasets on inequality although agree with a 
value of around 0.55 throughout our period. Another indicator of persistence in inequality is the fact 
that according to Chile’s Central Bank data, average real wages have increased by 38% between 1993 
and 2005, while real GDP has increased by 76% over the same period. 
49 Casual observation illustrates this statistical evidence.  In Santiago, for example, you can travel from 
poor Latin America to a rich European city in less than 45 minutes (if travel congestion is not too bad) 
by going from the vast southern, or western, or northern edges of the city (combined population circa 5 
million) to the plush “barrio alto” (population 1 million) located in part of the north east area of the 
city. 
50 In a recent study Sapelli (2007) shows evidence supporting a reduction in inequality for younger 
cohorts, which could signal that education may be playing a role in reducing income inequality. 
However, the results of this study must be taken with caution, since they rely on a biased sample that 
only includes workers from Santiago that report positive work income, thus not including unemployed 




which democracy promised to correct. A promise condensed in “growth with 
equality”, a slogan often used by politicians in the nineties. A failure to meet this 
promise is leading to rising social dissatisfaction and is perhaps the most important 
shortcoming of what has been considered the most successful development 
experience in Latin America. Moreover, as a consequence of this, a cycle of 
increasing anger and violence which might eventually threat the very foundations of 
economic growth itself appears to be in gestation. 
 
This chapter explores the sources of persistent inequality in Chile despite that the 
country has grown at a reasonably fast rate over an extensive period of time and 
despite that the structure or composition of public expenditures, more so than many 
other developing countries, is clearly tilted in favor of the low income classes. 
Furthermore, Chile represents a case where governments are relatively efficient and 
affected by little corruption with generally adequate institutions. Yet Chile has 
remained an utterly unequal society which is fully reflected in a generalized 
perception of unfairness among Chileans, which is also the cause of profound social 
discontent51
                                                 
51 According to the July, 2007 poll from CEP (2007), the three most important problems to Chileans 
are concerned with are: crime, health and poverty, which are compatible with the feeling of an unjust 
society. Moreover, the latest Latinobarometro (2007) poll also reports that only 10% of Chileans 
believe that income distribution is fair or very fair. Within the sample of Latin American countries 
only Peru and Paraguay have higher perceptions of unfairness. 
. What then went wrong in Chile?  In this paper we present an integrated 
hypothesis to explain this phenomenon based on the existing empirical evidence. We 
believe that there are important lessons emerging from this analysis that are relevant 
not only for Chile but also for many other developing countries especially in Latin 




growth, have relatively effective governments and yet high or worsening inequality 
that put in jeopardy the minimum social consensus needed for growth to continue. 
2. Pattern of Growth, Inequality and Government Intervention 
 
Income distribution has remained abysmally unequal despite that the economy has 
performed well. The average annual per capita growth rate was about 4% per annum 
over the 1990-2006 period although it showed a considerable deceleration during the 
second half of such period. Even more importantly, the government’s modest but 
steady increase in the share of social expenditures in total expenditures has been 
insufficient to improve wealth distribution. The structure of public expenditures 
directed mainly to provide public and social goods, including public education and 
health care, rather than pro-elite subsidies (in contrast to many other countries) has 
been on the whole commendable. These programs have also targeted the low income 
strata of the population quite well. In this respect Chile’s public expenditures have 
been much more pro poor than most other Latin American countries (López, 2003). 
 
Figure 6 shows the pre government social subsidy income (the “autonomous 
income”) and the post government subsidy income (“total income”) by income 
deciles of the households. As can be seen the government social subsidies benefit the 
poorest deciles quite significantly as the gap between total and autonomous income is 
larger for the poorest deciles52
                                                 
52 This Figure also shows how important are the social subsidies for the income of the poor and how 
little a significance they have for affecting the overall income distribution. 




quasi-gini coefficients for public education and health for 17 Latin American 
countries. Chile had by far the most progressive distribution of social expenditures. In 
both health and education the estimated quasi-gini coefficients for Chile in 2003 are 
negative (at -0.26 and -0.19 respectively) reflecting that they benefit mainly the lower 
income classes. In general, unlike other countries, the government in Chile has spent 
only a small portion of its revenues in unproductive subsidies directed to the elites.53
 
   
 
Figure 6: Chile: Income per capita by decile 
Source: CASEN 2003 and own Calculations 
 
However, the real issue has been that the level of expenditures in public goods has 
been insufficient as a consequence, as we shall see, of the rather narrow tax base 
which greatly constrained public revenues. The tax system has failed to feed the 
public sector with enough resources to enhance the scope of an otherwise almost 
                                                 
53 Chile has few direct non-social subsidies. Soto (2004) estimates the value of non-social state 
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exemplary public expenditure system. According to IDB-ECLAC, over the period 
1990-2003 total government expenditure in social public goods (education, health, 
social housing and anti-poverty programs) as a proportion of GDP has been below the 
average for Latin America in every two-year period for which it was estimated 
(ECLAC, 2005), despite that the government devotes the bulk of its revenues to such 
expenditures.   
 
The most important social public goods that the state should provide are education 
and health care especially for the lower segments of the population. In the absence of 
state support the low income classes tend to under invest in human capital as a 
consequence of credit market failures (López and Galinato, 2007). In addition, the 
state needs to invest in knowledge and technology (R&D) and on protecting the 
environmental quality assets on which the private sector tends to under invest as a 




The gradual but steady increase in education expenditures as a share of GDP (as 
shown in Table 4) , has not been sufficient to induce greater access to pre-primary 
education and good quality of public education thereafter for the low income classes 
that are most dependent on the state for their human capital investments (and which 
constitute the majority of the population). This has condemned an important segment 




important factor leading to the perpetuation of inequality. Additionally it has also 
been a factor that has conspired against economic efficiency and faster growth.  
 
Table 4: Chile. Government Expenditure by Function 1987-2005 (% of GDP) 
 
 1987-1989 1990-1997 1998-2005 
Government and Public 
Services 3.0 2.0 1.4 
Defense 2.9 1.7 1.6 
Public Order and Safety 1.0 1.0 1.3 
Economic Affairs 2.8 2.6 2.8 
Environmental Protection 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Housing and community 
affairs 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Health 2.0 2.2 2.9 
Recreation, Culture and 
religion 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Education 2.7 2.5 3.7 
Social Protection 9.5 7.6 7.4 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 24.2 20.0 21.4 
  Source: DIPRES (2006) 
 
 
The failure of the government education efforts has been confirmed by the rather 
dismal performance of Chilean students in standardized international tests. If one 
controls for per capita income, Chilean students test scores are below the international 






Figure 7: Score in PISA test 2000 and National Income 
Source: OECD and UNESCO, 2003. Table 3.3 
 
As shown in Figure 8 Chile is one of the countries that spend the least per student 
(about 50% less than Korea, for example)54
                                                 
54 Importantly, the figures on expenditure per student include the private sector, which spends about 4 
times more per student than the public sector. That is, the expenditure per student in public and semi-
public schools, which account for more than 85% of the total student population in the country, is 
much less than what appears in the Figure 8. We estimate that the cumulative expenditure per student 
by age 15 in the public system amounts to about 11,000 US PPP, versus around 40,000 in the private 
sector. The average annual public expenditure per student in municipal schools was about 700 US$ in 
2003, and for government-subsidized subvencionados schools the average public expenditure was 625 
US$ (both values in current dollars) versus an estimated 2400 US$ per student spent by private sector.  
. Moreover, this Figure illustrates an 
important feature: Countries that spend too little and countries that spend too much in 
education tend to score below the international norm represented by the upward 
sloping line. By contrast, countries in the middle of the expenditure spectrum tend to 
over perform the international norm. Out of seventeen countries that spend the mean 
expenditure level plus minus one standard deviation (roughly between $20000 and 
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$60000) only two (Italy and Portugal) have scores below the international norm. By 
contrast, six of the seven countries that spend less than $20,000 per student score 
below the norm and all countries that spend above $60,000 score below the norm as 
well. When the education budget is too high, technical efficiency is low because there 
is a tendency to spend resources in activities of a smaller and smaller marginal value. 
By contrast, when the budget is very low, as in Chile, there is also low efficiency for 
the simple reason that there are too little resources left from purely operational 
activities to allow sufficient investments in adequate teacher training, special 
education facilities, and so forth. At low levels of expenditure per student, high levels 
of efficiency appear to be unattainable due to lack of resources to invest in efficiency.  
 
Figure 8: Score in PISA test 2000 and Cumulative Expenditure in Education  


































0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000







Several studies have, nonetheless, shown that the rate of return to education for Chile 
is relatively high although they also show enormous disparities in such returns across 
income groups. According to Psacharopoulus and Patrinos (2002) the returns to 
education were about 12% in 1989, slightly above the average of 10% for all 
countries surveyed55
 
. Moreover, Patrinos et al (2006) shows that one additional year 
of education for the poorest 10% of the population increases their wages by only 7%, 
while it increases by 14% for the richest 10% of the population. Thus this disparity in 
rate of return is likely to further worsen income distribution.  
According to Herrera and Pang (2006) within a sample of developing countries Chile 
has by far the most efficient public spending in education as measured using a free 
disposable hull or data enveloped analysis. Thus, Chile may be near the efficiency 
frontier but with low scores which basically implies that is has plenty of room to 
increase spending in order to improve educational achievement. The argument that 
“we should not spend more in public education until efficiency improves” is likely to 
be fallacious for Chile. 
 
In summary, it appears that poor quality of education in Chile as reflected in the 
extremely low performance in international tests is not due to inefficiency of the 
government education effort. Neither it is due to low potential rates of return to 
education in Chile. It simply reflects insufficient levels of public expenditure in 
education despite the government devotes a significant share of its expenditures to 
                                                 
55 Using a similar approach Contreras et al (2005) find a similar return, between 11-14%, depending on 




education. The low level of education expenditures has been a key factor in 
preventing a significant expansion in the quality of human capital of the population, 
particularly of the poorest segments which are the ones most dependent on the state. 
This, in turn, has been one of the major factors explaining not only the permanence of 
unacceptable levels of inequality but also has reduced the overall growth potential of 
the economy.  
 
The extreme levels of income inequality appear to be both a cause and an effect of the 
poor education performance reflected in the international tests. Figure 9 shows a 
significant negative correlation between test scores and the level of income inequality 
represented by the Gini index of income inequality. High levels of income inequality 
(for a given average level of per capita income) mean that a high proportion of school 
children must be dependent on the state for acquiring education. If the quality of 
education provided by the state is below that of the private sector, the negative effect 
of inequality on the average test scores follows. This implies that for highly unequal 
countries the role of the state in providing good quality education is even more crucial 
than in more equal societies. So the failure of the Chilean state in providing enough 
resources to education that would permit improving public sector efficiency is even 
more serious than in countries with a better distribution of income. Chile, with one of 
the highest levels of income inequality in the world, is right on the international norm 
in this respect (Figure 9). Spending too little in public or semi-public education is 







Figure 9: Score in PISA test 2000 and Income Inequality 
Source: OECD and UNESCO, 2003. Tables 1.4 and 3.3 
 
In effect in a very simple econometric exercise (see Table 5) we show that income 
inequality and cumulative expenditures in education are both statistically significant. 
We present these results also excluding the three most unequal countries in our 
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Table 5: Econometric estimates, 
Dependent variable: Average test score in Math and Science PISA 2000 
 
 Full Sample  
Without Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico 
GDP per capita 0.046 0.045 





Income Gini -0.205*** -0.211*** 
[0.050] [0.072] 
Constant 5.759*** 5.781*** 
 [0.335] [0.393] 
Observations 28 25 
R-squared 0.84 0.78 
Standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Apart from the obvious implications for equity and for the productivity of the 
economy, this trap has other important economic ramifications: it makes the factor 
endowments of the economy, in particular the natural/physical capital to human 
capital ratio extremely high. In an open economy such as Chile this is likely to cause 
an excessive specialization on sectors that are mainly natural resource and physical 
capital intensive to the detriment of knowledge intensive industries. If human capital 
or knowledge intensive industries have a greater potential for productivity growth 
than resource/physical capital intensive industries, this supports de Gregorio’s (2005) 
hypothesis that ‘…there is much potential to increase productivity and thus 
income…’ through investment in knowledge and human capital formation. The other 




natural resource industries. This, in turn, may severely restrict the long run growth 
potential of the economy56
 
. 
Other government expenditures to palliate the effects of market failure 
 
Chilean levels of R&D investment are very low only reaching about 0.5% of GDP, 
which compares poorly with other developing or low income developed countries 
such as Israel 4.5%, Korea 2.6%, Ireland 1,2%, China, India, Brazil, Spain and New 
Zealand, all close to 1% (OECD, 2003). The state spends less than 0.4% of GDP in 
R&D. Out of this roughly 55% is allocated towards basic research, as opposed to 
applied research (de Gregorio, 2005). The private sector does not compensate for the 
low public expenditures in R&D. Private expenditure in R&D by firms only 
represents 26% of the total expenditure compared with for example 70% in Sweden. 
This also affects the future economic growth potential, since low levels of R&D 
means fewer opportunities in the future for developing new businesses. 
 
Public expenditures on enforcing environmental legislation and other environmental 
investments have also been low. As we discuss later, the low expenditures in 
enforcement has been a key factor behind the low degree of compliance with 
environmental regulations that studies have detected in Chile. According to DIPRES 
                                                 
56 In fact Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2005) find in a cross country regression that natural resource 
dependence is “bad” for growth. However when interacting natural resources with human capital they 
also find that this would overturn the result; hence countries that rely heavily on natural resources but 
have high human capital can in fact perform better. De Ferranti et al (2002) also suggest similarly that 
a resource curse may not necessarily exist and correctly show several examples of resource rich 




(2006) Chile spends about 0.1% of GDP in environmental protection. This level of 
expenditure would appear as clearly insufficient to cover even the most basic needs of 





Despite the evident insufficiencies on the supply of important public and semi public 
goods the economy has been able to grow at reasonable rates mainly, as we shall see, 
on the basis of a constant expansion of the natural resource sector and a few other 
related industries. This adequate growth rate in combination with small but well 
targeted expenditures in social public goods have yielded an important social 
dividend: absolute poverty has declined significantly. In fact, as measured by head 
count poverty using a US$2 a day poverty line, absolute poverty was cut in half (from 
38% in 1990 to 19% in 2003, Table 6). But another 30% of the population is still 
within 40% of the rather modest official poverty line. One needs to go to the second 
richest quintile to find households with per capita incomes at least 100% above the 
poverty line (Figure 6). Thus while poverty reduction has been impressive, keeping a 
large portion of the population within a short margin of a rather low poverty line 






Table 6: Evolution of Poverty and Inequality (1987-2003) 
 










1987 45.1 17.4  .. ..  0.57 
1990 38.6 12.9 14.0 3.5 0.58 
1992 32.6 8.8 13.2 3.3 0.57 
1994 27.5 7.6 14.3 3.5 0.57 
1996 23.2 5.7 14.6 3.5 0.57 
1998 21.7 5.6 15.5 3.5 0.58 
2000 20.6 5.7 15.3 3.6 0.58 
2003 18.8 4.7 14.3 3.3 0.57 
  Source: CASEN (several years) 
 
 
So why a reasonable rate of economic growth combined with a public expenditure 
structure mainly oriented to satisfy the provision of social services and other public 
goods has failed to yield the other dividend, a more equitable income distribution? 
We show below that the main reason for this is that the democratic regimes limited 
themselves to mainly minor changes to the tax system that they inherited from the 
dictatorship. This has caused a narrow tax base which has severely restricted the 
scope of an essentially adequate pro-equality public expenditure policy and at the 
same time has allowed the elites to contribute very little to the development effort. 
The conventional wisdom has been that altering the tax level and structure are not 
effective mechanisms to affect income distribution. We argue below that given the 
existing extremely biased and generous (to the wealthy) Chilean tax system this 
conventional wisdom is not likely to be valid for Chile. We show that the tax system 
far from being distributional neutral is clearly regressive favoring a tiny fraction of 




serious tax reform may go a long way to increase not only social equity but economic 
efficiency as well. 
       
We focus on three features of the tax system which have particularly attempted 
against social equity, the environment and, ultimately, against the long-run growth 
potential of the economy: (1) Low tax revenues and an extreme dependency of 
government revenues on indirect taxes.  (2) The preservation of a vast collection of 
tax loopholes (the so-called “gastos tributarios”) that in 2004 amounted to close to 
5% of GDP and almost 30% of tax revenues; (3) The almost complete failure by the 
state to share the revenues from the raw natural resources (including ore resources, 
fisheries, lumber, water and others) that are removed from the national patrimony. 
3. Low Tax Revenues and High Dependence on Indirect Taxes 
 
At about 16% over GDP, the total tax burden of the Chilean economy over the last 
few years has been quite low by international standards (OECD average: 36%; 
Mexico: 18%; Korea: 24%, see Table 7)57.  Corporate tax revenues at 2.9% of GDP 
are one of the lowest in the world58
                                                 
57 Since Chile has a private social contribution scheme for pensions, we may want to remove these 
from the OECD calculations. In this case the OECD average tax burden would be reduced to 26% of 
GDP. However, this is not a fair comparison either since the Chilean government still provides some 
(social) pensions that are financed with general taxation. 
. The effective corporate tax rate as a proportion 
of the profits of the private sector are estimated at less than 6% over the last ten 
58 In reality, the private corporate sector pays even less, only about 2% of GDP, because part of the 
revenues of the state copper corporation and other state enterprises are counted as part of the corporate 
tax revenues. The copper state firm is taxed at a much greater effective rate than the private firms 






. Similarly, personal income tax collected amounts to less than 1.6% of GDP 
by far the lowest among all OECD countries including middle income countries such 
as Mexico (5.2%) and Korea (3.2%). The natural consequence of this unusually low 
income and profit taxes is that the state has to greatly rely on indirect taxes as a 
source of revenues. In fact, the share of indirect taxes in total tax revenue has been 
about 68%, by far the highest among all OECD countries; the second highest is 
Mexico with 49% and the average OECD rate is just 32%. 








Tax structures  
as % of total tax receipts 




















% Employees Employers 
Chileb  16.6  10.0  17.8 .. ..  67.8  4.6  40.0  17.0 
Greece  35.9  14.0  10.4  12.7  15.5  37.3  10.1  33.6  35.0 
Ireland  28.4  26.2  13.1  4.5  9.6  39.5  7.1  42.0  16.0 
Korea  24.4  12.8  12.8  11.1  7.7  38.8  16.8  36.7  29.7 
Mexico  18.1  28.9 ..  17.9 ..  49.0  3.5  35.0  35.0 
New Zealand  34.9  42.3  12.1  0.0  0.0  35.2  10.4  39.0  33.0 
Portugal  33.9  27.6 ..  27.1 ..  41.1  4.2  35.6  33.0 
Spain  35.6  19.4  9.1  5.6  24.9  28.6  12.4  48.0  35.0 
EU averagec  40.6  25.8  8.6  9.1  16.3  30.8  9.4  44.6  32.4 
OECD averagec  36.3  26.0  9.3  8.3  14.6  31.9  9.8  42.6  31.2 
Source: OECD Tax Database and DIPRES (2006) 
a International comparisons should also take into account differences among countries in the length of tax brackets, the amount 
of tax relief and rates of social security contributions. The highest rate of income tax includes temporary special surcharges. All 
rates include rates of state and local income taxes as reported in the OECD Tax Database. 
b For Chile taxes on goods and services include VAT, Taxes on specific goods and Tariffs, Other Taxes include and taxes over 
legal transactions and other taxes. Corporate tax rate does not include an additional tax rate of 35% for foreign investors. 
c Unweighted average.    
 
 
                                                 
59 We assume that the share of capital in GDP is 0.54, and divide corporate taxes/GDP by this number 
to obtain the effective corporate tax rate. Some studies (eg. De Gregorio 2005) suggest using a capital 
share of 0.35, and an average corporate taxes over GDP of 2.9% we get an effective tax rate of 8.3%. 





This has not changed significantly in the past decade and a half (see Table 8).  The 
tax structure in Chile relies heavily on indirect taxes where the VAT amounts to about 
45-50% of government tax revenue. Income taxes account for another 25% (up from 
15% in 1987)60, trade taxes are down to less than 3% (from roughly 15% in 1987)61
 
. 
Other specific taxes (fuel for transport and luxury goods) account for another 12% 
(down from 15%). 























1987-1989 16.9 46.2 13.5 13.9 9.5 15.9 
1990-1997 22.8 48.0 11.5 12.8 5.0 15.4 
1998-2005 26.2 48.6 13.0 6.2 5.9 15.3 
Source: Own elaboration based on DIPRES 2006 
 
 
So the fact is that Chile has low tax revenues. There are three potential explanations 
for this: (1) Low tax rates; (2) Poor tax enforcement, or high evasion of taxes; and (3) 
Exemptions to taxes due to tax loopholes or exempted activities. Looking at each of 
these we observe that in fact, tax rates in Chile are not low. The highest marginal tax 
rate for personal income is at 40%. VAT rate is 19%, in fact high compared to other 
countries; corporate tax rate at 17% although lower than other countries is not as low 
as for example Ireland at 12.5%. Therefore we discard this as an explanation for low 
revenues.  
                                                 
60 However income taxes may vary significantly since they include 40% taxes on profits from state 
owned firms including copper mining which vary significantly according to the price of copper. 
61 Currently Chile has FTA’s with amongst others USA, EU, EFTA, MERCOSUR, South Korea, India, 
and China. In March 2007 Chile has reached an agreement to sign a FTA with Japan. This yields an 





Chile has also reached relatively high levels of tax compliance. In 1993, estimates 
indicated that VAT evasion reached 23%, while other Latin American countries 
averaged over 30% (Barra and Jorrat, 1999). Other developed countries had both 
lower levels and higher levels of evasion62
 
. Over the last several years tax evasion has 
been reduced specially in VAT, which in turn accounted directly or indirectly for 
about 80% of total tax evasion in the country (Barra and Jorrat, 1999). Evasion was 
estimated at about 20% of VAT in 1996-1999. Since 2000, new efforts have been 
made to reduce evasion even more. Preliminary results indicate that evasion has been 
reduced by 30%. Moreover, VAT evasion has dropped to only 11% in 2005 (La 
Nacion, 2007). 
This leaves us with only one possibility. As we show below tax exemptions in the 
form of tax loopholes and untaxed rents of natural resources are in fact the source of 
low revenues in Chile. 
4. Tax Loopholes and Income Distribution 
  
A recent study by the government’s tax office shows that existing legal tax loopholes 
are very large and tremendously regressive. Total tax loopholes amount to foregone 
fiscal revenues of the order of 4% of GDP and 25% of all state revenues. The most 
important tax loopholes are those affecting income taxes (3.3% of GDP) and the VAT 
                                                 




(0.7% of GDP). About 81% of the income tax loopholes benefits the wealthiest 5% of 
the population and 61% goes to the richest 1% of the population! (Table 9).  That is, 
the wealthiest 1% of the population receives a transfer equivalent to almost 2% of 
GDP through this mechanism. It is hard to imagine a more regressive public policy 
than this. A similar though less perverse conclusion arises from analyzing loopholes 
in the value added tax (which constitutes almost 15% of all tax loopholes). The 
wealthiest quintile received more than 70% of the total value added tax benefits.  
 






P96 P97 P98 P99 P100 Subtotalg 
Special 
Regimesa 58 0.4% 0.7% 1.3% 3.2% 38.0% 43.6% 
Exemptionsb 33 0.9% 1.4% 1.7% 3.3% 78.6% 85.9% 
Deductionsc 140 6.4% 7.3% 10.6% 18.5% 27.6% 70.4% 
Tax creditsd 121 1.6% 2.1% 3.6% 5.5% 57.4% 70.2% 
Tax defermentse 1426 3.2% 3.4% 4.7% 7.9% 66.6% 85.8% 
Total 1777 3.2% 3.5% 4.9% 8.3% 60.8% 80.7% 
Source: SII, Sub direction of Studies, March 2006 
Notes: Although it refers to personal income it includes forgone corporate taxes. In Chile corporate 
taxes count as credits for personal income taxes.   
a This includes special regimes for small agriculture, mining, transportation and fishing industries. 
b Activities exempted from certain taxes such as free trade zones or special areas and educational 
institutions. 
c Donations to education and sport and political institutions. 
d Credits for donations, setting up in special zones and special treatment to agriculture land and fixed 
assets. 
e Deferments due to accelerated depreciation, retained profits and private pension savings plans. 
f Only tax forgone for highest 5 percentiles of income 
g As a % total tax personal income forgone 
 
Of all income tax benefits, tax deferments represent the bulk of forgone taxes. Tax 
deferments are due to accelerated depreciation, retained and reinvested profits from 
small businesses, and private compulsory and voluntary pension funds tax benefits. 





Using the data from these studies, plus income share data from the 2003 CASEN 
survey we simulate the elimination of forgone income taxes. These account for about 
3.27% of GDP in 2004. Moreover, 98% of them are received by the highest quintile 
of income, and 80% is received by the richest 5% of the population. Roughly 90% of 
the total forgone taxes go to the top income decile63. We then subtract this income 
from the top decile of income and distribute it in two ways. We first assume a lump-
sum transfer equal for all households (including the richest 10%). Then we try a 
proportional transfer using the same shares of monetary subsidies. We show that 
eliminating most tax loopholes can reduce inequality in a dramatic way (Table 10). 
Another tax reform we explore is using the proceeds to reduce other taxes. We 
simulate the effect on the VAT rate, of using these proceeds to reduce the VAT. The 
VAT rate can fall in this case from 19% to 11.5% after the tax reform64
 
. We then 
simulate the impact on inequality of reducing the VAT rate. Although this seems to 
have a more moderate impact on inequality, still the most benefited from this are the 
poorest income groups. 
  
                                                 
63 Although we do not posses the exact figure, by interpolating the data 90% we obtain this number. 
64 Note that we are not considering additional revenue given the lower rates. The literature has argued 
that higher rates lead towards higher evasion, so reduction in rates should increase tax compliance and 




Table 10: Income distribution before and after simulated tax reform (with equal 
distribution of forgone taxes) 
 




(2003) 14.3 13.4 34.1 7.3 0.50 
Reform with equal 
Distribution 12.7 12.1 28.1 6.8 0.48 
Reform with Distribution 
same as monetary 
subsidies 11.0 11.3 21.2 6.7 0.47 
VAT Reduction a 12.5     
Source: Own estimations based on CASEN (2003), SII (2006) and household savings rate obtained 
from Butelman and Gallego (2001). 
Note: All indicators are based on household income rather than personal income; therefore the Gini 
coefficients reported here are lower than those reported earlier which were person based. 
a For this exercise we use monetary income and only quintile data, since we do not have savings rate at 
decile level, to compare expenditures and savings. The before reform in this case only yields a Q5/Q1 
of 12.7. The VAT rate is however reduced from 19% to 11.5%. 
 
Are tax loopholes effective in promoting more investment and higher 
productivity? 
 
It is extraordinary that the economic and social consequences of a government policy 
that allocates more than 4% of GDP and nearly 25% of government revenues to a 
variety of tax loopholes that benefit a small part of the richest segment of Chilean 
society has received almost no attention. For this reason we need to refer to studies 
elsewhere to obtain some insights about the efficiency impact of tax loopholes. Since 
these tax loopholes are targeted to special interest groups or preferential activities and 
since they subtract massive public resources that could be used in increasing the 
provision of public goods or in across-the-board tax reductions there is suspicion that 




well65. Many empirical studies around the world have consistently shown that these 
tax incentives tend, in fact, to be ineffective in promoting investment and 
employment. For Israel, Bregman et al (1999) using detailed firm-level data finds that 
production inefficiencies in the form of over investment from capital subsidies reach 
up to 15%. Fakin (1995) analyzes capital subsidies for Slovenia and other parts of 
former Yugoslavia and also does not find evidence that tax incentives similar to those 
used in Chile generate higher growth; Lee (1996) for Korea, Bergstrom (1998) for 
Sweden, Estache and Gaspar (1995) for Brazil and Harris (1991) for Northern Ireland 
all reach similar conclusions. Crowding-out of private investment due to the subsidies 
also occurs. Though no such studies are available for Chile, it is hard to argue that the 
tax incentives may be any more effective in Chile than elsewhere66
5. Resource Dependency and Economic Distortions 
.  
 
Chile’s economy is one of the most natural resource dependent in the world. The 
average share of natural resource exports in total exports amounted to 90% in the 
1998-2005 period and the estimated share of natural resource dependent industries in 
GDP was more than 20% over the same period (Table 11). The economy relies 
heavily on the extraction or use of natural resources, mainly copper, fishmeal, 
cellulose, salmon farming and agricultural products (wine, fresh fruit and meat). The 
                                                 
65 Taxes are not a means to improve distribution but rather to collect revenue, and it should be done in 
the most efficient manner. However the tax system should not worsen social equity, especially in 
countries that already have a highly concentrated distribution of wealth as in Chile.  
66 The only related study that we have found for Chile is consistent with the findings elsewhere. Bustos 
et al (2004) finds that a higher corporate tax rate does not affect capital accumulation in the long-run 





issue is not whether resource dependency is bad or good for growth, which is an issue 
not yet fully resolved in the literature67.  The key point we make is that the resource 
based sectors in Chile obtain large indirect subsidies that distort the structure of 



















Argentina 14.5 9.1 8.6 11.9 19.4 12.7 
Brazil 10.8 7.3 6.1 6.7 10.4 8.3 
Chile 32.4 42.9 40.8 39.5 44.0 39.9 
Greece 16.0 15.6 15.5 15.3 14.8 15.4 
High income: OECD 8.1 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.8 6.2 
Ireland 33.2 28.6 24.9 17.8 10.3 22.9 
Korea, Rep. 5.8 4.6 3.3 4.5 5.2 4.7 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 20.4 15.8 12.6 13.0 17.0 15.8 
Mexico 19.6 18.2 11.4 10.5 9.5 13.8 
New Zealand 36.4 31.0 31.7 30.2 31.4 32.2 
Portugal 13.2 11.2 9.0 7.8 7.9 9.8 
Spain 8.1 7.7 6.4 7.9 9.1 7.8 
Upper middle income 28.3 n/a 14.8 18.5 21.7 21.5 
Source: World Bank. 
aIncludes agriculture raw materials, food, fuels and ores and mineral exports 
 
 
                                                 
67 There is some controversy regarding the disadvantages for economic growth and inequality that  
dependency on natural resource industries entails. The majority of the empirical analyses have 
concluded that resource dependent countries have tended to grow less and are more socially 
inequitable than other countries (see Barbier, 2005 for a thorough survey). What is quite clear, 
however, is that the potential for productivity growth is greater in knowledge intensive industries and 
services than in resource and pollution intensive industries. Countries that have been able to embark in 
the former type of industries are able to grow faster and more equitably than countries such as Chile 
that have locked in the latter types of industries. Moreover, even resource rich countries with high 
growth have only achieved this having a high initial level of human capital as well (Bravo-Ortega and 
de Gregorio, 2005). 
68 It is possible that part of the resource dependency may arise from external shocks driven by high 
commodity prices. However, Chile’s dependency on natural resources has not changed significantly in 




Resource industries generally do not pay fees or royalties for the use of the natural 
resource. In 2005 a small royalty was first applied only towards certain mining 
activity, but the rate is by far one of the lowest in the world. It applies to net profits 
with a rate of up to 5%, but they can be deducted to calculate income for the general 
corporate tax. The net royalty payments effectively amount to less than 2% of profits 
and less than 0.6% of the value of sales69
 
. Water resources and fishing rights are 
grandfathered towards users through property rights and are affected by no royalties 
or any other special taxes, so effectively they do not pay the social cost of use.  
A conservative estimate puts the in situ annual value of the raw natural resources 
extracted (the resource rents) just by the private copper mining sector (that is, 
excluding the state mining corporation, CODELCO) at about 2 % of GDP. As can be 
seen in Table 12 this estimate is based on data for the period 1997-2002, which 
include the lowest real prices of copper in the last 50 years (Svedberg and Tilton, 
2006). The rents over the period 2003-06 which covers two “boom” years are much 




                                                 
69 By international standards this is very low. For example, Canada varies by province with a minimum 
of 8% of “mine mouth value” with some provinces charging a much higher rate (IDRC, 2004); 
Australia also varies by region with the lowest rate of 2.5% of the sales ad-valorem; in the US, Arizona 
charge a 2% ad-valorem, while Nevada and Michigan have sliding scale with a 2% minimum (Otto et 
al, 2006). In addition, the normal corporate taxes rates in these countries are much higher than in Chile, 
where have effectively reached less than 15% of net profits. Even developing countries have also much 
higher rates. Here are some examples of “mine mouth value” rates in developing countries: Argentina 
3%, Colombia 1%-12%; or other countries use gross or net sales Brazil 0.2%-3%  (of net sales) Peru 
1%-3% gross sales (IDRC, 2004).  
70 In 2006 for example, admittedly a year of high copper prices, the private mines in Chile declared 
profits of US$14.4 billion (about 10% of the total GDP of the country) out of an estimated total initial 
investment (mainly implemented over the nineties) of about $12 billion (Soto, 2004) and paid just 




Table 12: Private Mining Rents as % of GDP 1997-2002 
 (In millions of current US$ and % of GDP) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sales 4,263 3,367 4,167 5,207 5,141 4820 
Operating Costs 2,235 2,279 2,741 2,907 2,896 2,856 
Depreciation 1,290 1,093 848 566 698 597 
Financial Costs 86 181 235 309 305 579 
Taxes Due 306 99 134 167 117 86 
Rents (Net Profits) 1636 808 1057 1824 1823 1299 
Rents as % of GDP 2.0% 1.0% 1.4% 2.4% 2.6% 2.0% 
Average rent 1997-2002   1.9% 
Source: Soto (2004) and own calculations. 
 
It is difficult to estimate resource rents for the several other resource based industries 
in the economy. Over the period 1997-2002 average exports of non copper natural 
resources were almost 50% larger than copper exports from private mines. If we 
assume that rents per dollar exported are half in the latter sectors vis-a-vis the mining 
sector, we would reach an estimated rent of 1.5% of GDP for the non-copper sectors. 
A conservative estimate would then put the normal annual rents of privately owned 
resources at about 3.5% of GDP. This is probably the absolute lowest bound of the 
normal resource rents. For example, an authoritative source puts the value of rents for 
Chile in the year 2000 at 9% of GDP (Hamilton, 2006).   
 
These rents correspond to the in situ value of the ore that private mining firms extract 
as well as the water and biological resources removed from the country’s natural 
patrimony. Yet the natural resource based industries have been allowed to appropriate 
this patrimony for free. Or, equivalently, the natural resource based industries do not 
have to pay for one of its most important inputs, the raw natural resource that they 





This discrimination in favor of resource intensive industries is extended to 
environmentally dirty industries as well. While environmental norms are generally 
adequate in theory, its enforcement has been weak due to lack of monitoring, low 
budget for the environmental agencies, and lack of political clout of such agencies. 
Powerful business sectors have constantly used their considerable political 
connections and control of the media to pressure towards relaxing environmental 
standards arguing that environmental protection reduces economic growth. A recent 
report by the OECD (2005) has concluded that the absence of environmental 
enforcement and policy coordination is perhaps the biggest problem in this respect.  
 
As a consequence the environmental indicators show mixed results. Chile shows 
some improvement in certain environmental indicators, such as air quality in Santiago 
and treatment of water discharges around the country (Universidad de Chile, 2000). 
But mineral mining in the north, extensive industrial fishing in the coast, and forestry 
activity and salmon farming in the south generate potentially harmful long term 
environmental impacts which do not seem to be adequately mitigated due to poor 
enforcement of existing environmental laws. Moreover, there is little hard data on the 
extent of the environmental damages that these industries are inducing. This lack of 
interest in collecting environmental data reflects the seemingly low priority that the 
government gives to environmental degradation. The lack of enforcement of 
environmental regulations constitutes yet another benefit that resource and 





Thus, in an economy where the role of markets is pervasive, clean non-resource (and 
non-polluting) dependent sectors pay the full market value for all their inputs while 
the dirty and resource dependent industries are able to get away without paying for a 
key input, the resource value and the pollution damage that they cause. Three obvious 
economic consequences follow from this implicit subsidy to the resource intensive 
and environmentally dirty industries:  
 
(i) Efficiency effect 1: By failing to tax the resource rents the state deprives 
itself from an important relatively non-distortionary source of potential tax revenues. 
If these rents were taxed the state could either reduce income and other taxes that do 
cause deadweight losses and/or increase the provision of public goods without having 
to raise taxes. The net effect would be efficiency enhancing. 
 
(ii) Efficiency effect 2: The fact that the resource based (and pollution-
intensive) industries do not pay for part of their inputs effectively means that the 
structure of economic incentives is biased against the non-resource and 
environmentally clean activities (including services, high technology industries, and 
so forth) which have to pay market prices for every input that they use, thus causing 
misallocation of resources which leads to obvious deadweight losses for society. 
Moreover, allowing the resource industries to retain almost all rents and failing to 
internalize the environmental costs imposed by dirty industries on the rest of the 




natural resource and environmentally demanding sectors. It may also smother the 
emergence of alternative clean, often human capital intensive industries with greater 
potential for productivity growth71
   
. Whether or not resource dependence is 
deleterious for economic growth, the key issue is quite obvious: If resource 
dependency is created or exacerbated by distortions that bias the structure of 
economic incentives in favor of such industries resource dependency is bad for 
efficiency and presumably bad for economic growth as well.      
(iii) Equity effects: Society effectively is transferring a large volume of wealth 
in the form of natural capital to a handful of mostly rich entrepreneurs. This 
contributes to exacerbate the highly unequal wealth distribution prevailing in the 




Unlike many other countries, public expenditures in Chile have not been the 
mechanism used by the state to favor the elites. Most pro-elite biases are instead 
channeled through an incredibly generous tax policy which allows for enormous tax 
loopholes and for large rents of the resource industries to go untaxed. In the end, 
however, the pro-elite biases so common among many countries have the same 
                                                 
71 This distortion of the public incentives against human capital-intensive industries may constitute a 
second blow to the development of such industries, the first one being the low endowment of human 
capital caused by the low investments in human capital by the state. Additionally, it may also 
constitute a second blow to the expansion of human capital itself as the slow development of human 
capital-intensive activities causes a sluggish demand for human capital and hence lowers the incentives 




negative impact on equity and long-run growth that the more obvious public 
expenditure biases have elsewhere. 
 
The Chilean experience suggests that an adequate public expenditure policy 
emphasizing the provision of public social goods could make a significant dent on 
poverty and promote reasonable growth. In fact composition and targeting of public 
expenditures in Chile has been commendable. However, such a policy by itself has 
been insufficient to improve income distribution and to allow for a growth rate that is 
sufficiently high to lead the country into genuine economic development.  
 
The general low income and corporate tax revenues caused by low effective tax rates 
from enormous tax loopholes favoring a small elite and the failure of the state to 
share part of the large rents generated by the extraction of the natural capital have led 
to greatly restrict public expenditure. By mainly benefiting the elites, the direct 
impact of these policies has been to exacerbate existing inequality. The indirect 
effects have probably been even more important in doing the same: (1) the low tax 
revenues have constrained the government’s budget leading to under investing in 
human capital among the low income classes, which are almost solely dependent on 
the public sector for these investments72
                                                 
72 We acknowledge the fact that human capital investments often benefit the rich rather than the poor. 
Therefore we explicitly call for investments targeted to these groups. In particular given the structure 
of educational system in Chile, this means increasing spending in public schools and/or the size of the 
education voucher, which are the schools attended by the low income groups. 
. (2) These policies have also distorted 





therefore reducing incentives to invest in more knowledge intensive industries, which 
could in turn increase the demand for human capital. The end result is low 
investments in human capital among the poor and semi-poor and an economy 
excessively dependent on resource-intensive industries. Low human capital 
investments among the low income classes prevent their incomes to grow faster than 
the country average and the excessive dependence on resource-intensive industries 
causes further inequality due to the tendency of these industries to be capital-intensive 
and to concentrate resource rents in a few hands. Thus, both the direct and indirect 
effects of the tax policies point in the direction of consolidating and even worsening 
economic inequality.      
 
This yields the following question. Why hasn’t the government raised the tax level? 
We do not claim to have an answer for this, but we hypothesis that this has been 
partly due to lack of a consistent majority in congress necessary to push through a 
reform of this kind, and in part due to unwillingness within the government coalition, 
perhaps for electoral or ideological reasons in certain groups within the coalition. The 
fact is that overall taxes in Chile have remained low. 
 
A final puzzle: why a respectable rate of economic growth has not reduced 
inequality? López and Torero (2007) using a sample of middle income countries 
(which includes Chile) show that growth itself after controlling for fiscal policies is 
an important factor in reducing inequality. There is clearly a missing link in the 




combination of low human capital investment and tax related distortions that have 
constrained the country to excessively rely on natural resource extractive industries, 
are important factors behind this phenomena. It is possible that natural resource 
dependency, while not inherently bad for growth, is a factor that makes economic 
growth less effective in diminishing inequality.  
 
The emphasis of this paper on fiscal budget constraints may seem quite irrelevant 
today for Chile which is currently enjoying an abundance of fiscal resources brought 
about by an unusually large bonanza on copper prices. If the government wanted it 
could now substantially increase expenditures in social goods and maintain the same 
degree of generosity towards the elites of its tax policy. Of course given that the 
copper price bonanza is unlikely to be permanent the government will not spend the 
temporary surpluses arising from such bonanza. The temporary nature of the current 
period of surpluses gives full validity to the emphasis on budget constraints that we 










Proofs of Chapter 2 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Starting from (28) and rearranging terms converts into: 
𝜕𝑤�
𝜕𝛼𝑚
= �𝑤𝑚 �1 −
𝛼𝑚𝜆𝛿(1−𝜙)
∆
� − 𝑤𝑝 �1 +
𝛼𝑝𝜆𝛿(1−𝜙)
∆




Again we know that this expression is negative iff: 
𝑤𝑚(Δ − 𝛼𝑚𝜆𝛿(1 − 𝜙)) − 𝑤𝑝�Δ − 𝛼𝑝𝜆𝛿(1 − 𝜙)� − 𝑤𝑟𝛼𝑟𝜆𝛿(1 − 𝜙) > 0 
and assuming λ>1 and introducing w(y) explicitly, this reduces to: Δ𝛿𝜆�1 −
𝜙𝜆) − 𝜆𝛿(1 − 𝜙)(𝛼𝑚𝛿𝜆 + 𝛼𝑝(𝜙𝛿)𝜆 + 𝛼𝑟) > 0. Denote  Δ� = 𝛼𝑚𝛿𝜆 +
𝛼𝑝(𝜙𝛿)𝜆 + 𝛼𝑟 and we obtain: Δ𝛿𝜆�1 − 𝜙𝜆� − 𝜆𝛿(1 − 𝜙)Δ� > 0 that yields 
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, will hold if αm is low enough. Rearranging this 
yields: 𝛼�𝑚 = 𝛿𝜆−1 �
𝛼𝑝𝛿𝜆�𝜙�1−𝜙𝜆�−𝜙𝜆(1−𝜙)𝜆�+𝛼𝑟�𝛿𝜆−1�1−𝜙𝜆�−(1−𝜙)𝜆�
(1−𝜙)𝜆𝛿−�1−𝜙𝜆�
�. Thus if 
𝛼𝑚 < 𝛼�𝑚 then it is always the case that (29) holds. We now look at the 
second condition. Assume therefore that 𝛼𝑚 > 𝛼�𝑚. From (29) take the limit 
when δ→0. The RHS of (29) is always greater than 1 since λ>1 and Δ� > 𝛥. 












Thus when δ→0 we have that 𝜕𝑤�
𝜕𝛼𝑚
 <0. 









Then we compare: �1−𝜙
𝜆�
(1−𝜙)
 with 𝜆 Δ
�
Δ
  when δ→1. A low value of φ implies that 
�1−𝜙𝜆�
(1−𝜙)
≅ 1 < 𝜆 Δ
�
Δ
. Thus we have that a high value of δ combined with a low 








Proof of Proposition 5. 








��(Δ− 𝛼𝑚𝛿)w� − Δ𝛼𝑟𝑤𝑟�� 








��(Δ− 𝛼𝑚𝛿)Δ� − Δ𝛼𝑟�� 
which is positive iff (Δ− 𝛼𝑚𝛿)Δ� − Δ𝛼𝑟 > 0, or equivalently if (Δ-(Δ−
𝛼𝑚𝛿Δ>Δ𝛼𝑟. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. 





Proof of Proposition 9. 
From (41) we know that money an increase in the size of the middle class 
affects both terms in brackets. The latter term will increase since the decrease 
in the size of the poor is multiplied by P which is always less than one. The 
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